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NRSRO Nullification
WHY RATINGS REFORM MAY BE IN PERIL
Jason W. Parsont†
[O]ne strategic move might be made by the Big Three
[Moody’s, S&P and Fitch] that would destabilize the status
quo: they could decide to surrender their NRSRO status, and
thereby avoid the more demanding provisions of the DoddFrank Act, which only apply to NRSROs. . . . [W]hen the
burdens outweigh the benefits, it makes sense for them to
1
abandon NRSRO status—if they can.

INTRODUCTION
In the words of Senator Christopher Dodd, Congress has
“spent an inordinate amount of time on the rating agency
question.”2 Scholars too have been deeply engaged in answering
this question and so have market participants, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and others.
The rating-agency question asks whether there is a
regulatory mechanism that can be adopted to encourage the
credit rating agencies (CRAs)—including those that are
nationally
recognized
statistical
rating
organizations
(NRSROs)3—to produce more accurate credit ratings on debt
securities, or whether another assessment of credit risk exists
†

Careers-in-Law-Teaching Fellow, Columbia Law School, J.D. For helpful
comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Frank Partnoy, Claire Hill, Paul Mahoney,
Victor Goldberg, Dan Dunson, Ari Blaut, Jordan Abramson, Jonathan Schalit, Yuliya
Guseva, Irene Ten Cate, Elizabeth Sepper, Aarthi Anand, Jennifer Sheridan and all
other participants in the Associates’ and Fellows’ Workshop at Columbia Law School. I
am also grateful to John Coffee and Charles Whitehead for their important advice and
for the support of friends and family.
1
John C. Coffee Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 1
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 231, 264 (2011).
2
156 CONG. REC. S3664, 3677 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Christopher Dodd).
3
“NRSROs,” as used herein, mean those ten CRAs, such as Moody’s, S&P,
and Fitch (the Big Three), that are registered with and regulated by the SEC. See
Commission Orders Granting NRSRO Registration, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency.htm (last visited
Jan. 22, 2012). For the legal definitions of CRA and NRSRO, see Sections 3(a)(61) and
(62) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(61), (62) (West 2011).

1015

1016

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:3

that could replace the need for credit ratings. Recently,
Congress found that inaccurate credit ratings on a type of debt
security—structured-finance products,4 such as subprime
residential mortgage-backed securities and collateralized-debt
obligations
(CDOs)—significantly
contributed
to
the
mismanagement of risk by investors during the financial crisis
of 2008.5 This, in turn, was a root cause of the crisis.6
Given the close scrutiny that has been devoted to this
question, including Congress’s recent legislative solution
(collectively, Ratings Reform),7 this article’s purpose is not to
propose a new answer, but to help refine the proposed answers.
It tackles a fundamental problem that has the potential to cause
any regulatory solution to the rating-agency question to
crumble: “NRSRO Nullification,” which is the exercise of the
NRSROs’ right to voluntarily withdraw from the regulatory
regime.8 Such action would undermine, if not completely nullify,
Ratings Reform and any future regulatory solutions. The
concept of NRSRO Nullification also encompasses the exercise of
the corollary right of the approximately seventy-six unregulated
CRAs (non-NRSROs)9 to refrain from registering and thereby
avoid the regulatory framework governing NRSROs.10
Ratings Reform was a compromise between the views of
two competing camps—the Free Market Camp and the Reform

4

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act defines
“structured finance product” as “an asset-backed security, as defined in section 3(a)(77)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by section 941, and any structured
product based on an asset-backed security, as determined by the Commission, by rule.”
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 939F(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1889 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
5
See infra note 66.
6
See infra note 69.
7
“Ratings Reform,” as used herein, means (1) Dodd-Frank, (2) the Credit
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006)
[hereinafter CRARA], and (3) the rules and regulations adopted thereunder.
8
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(e)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(e)(1)
(West 2011) (“[An NRSRO] may . . . withdraw from registration by furnishing a written
notice of withdrawal to the Commission”); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-1(g) (2011) (the
related withdrawal rule).
9
By one recent estimate, there are approximately seventy-six non-NRSROs
in the world, which figure includes some foreign affiliates of NRSROs. See Credit Rating
Agencies: (The Full Global List), DEFAULTRISK.COM, http://www.defaultrisk.com/rating_
agencies.htm (last modified Oct. 2011). Another estimate, from 1999, puts this number
at about 130. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKET 37 n.98 (2003)
[hereinafter SEC REPORT OF 2003] (citations omitted).
10
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(a) (setting forth the right of CRAs to voluntarily
register, or refrain from registering, as NRSROs).
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Camp.11 The Free Market Camp generally advocates
deregulation and replacing credit ratings with market
measures or a professional-judgment analysis as the solution to
the rating-agency question.12 Its goal is to decrease reliance on
credit ratings. The Reform Camp, on the other hand, generally
advocates closer regulation—including purging destructive
conflicts of interest—to improve the accuracy and reliability of
credit ratings.13 While Ratings Reform may have been a
compromise, the thrust of the combined legislation favors the
Reform Camp’s solution due to its emphasis on using
regulation and oversight to improve the quality of credit
ratings, even as it seeks to deemphasize their importance.
The prospect of NRSRO Nullification is thus most
problematic for those in the Reform Camp (including this
author), because it would permit the NRSROs to foil Congress’s
intent. In its most drastic form, all ten NRSROs could exercise
their withdrawal right, which would precipitate de facto
deregulation. It would be more likely, however, that only the
seven smallest NRSROs14 would exercise this right, which
would return the regulated club to only the Big Three—
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch.15 Either result would deprive society of
a regulatory mechanism to effectively promote accurate and
reliable ratings. In the absence of regulation, there would be no
way to collect comparative performance data, manage or
prohibit conflicts of interest, or realign incentives so that
accurate ratings—instead of issuer-friendly ratings—would
serve the NRSROs’ best business interests. If such regulation
only applied to the Big Three, then the comparative data set
and controls would be confined to this group, and there would
be significantly less incentive to compete over accuracy. While
some in the Free Market Camp might welcome NRSRO
Nullification,16 they too should be wary since market
11

See Coffee, supra note 1, at 246 (identifying the two camps of reformers);
see also infra note 63.
12
See infra Part I.C.
13
See infra Part I.C.
14
The seven smallest NRSROs are A.M. Best Co. (A.M. Best), Dominion
Bond Rating Service Limited (DBRS), Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. (Kroll), Japan
Credit Rating Agency (JCR), Rating and Investment Information (R&I), Egan-Jones
Ratings Company (Egan-Jones), and Morningstar Credit Ratings (Morningstar). See
infra notes 64, 102, 142.
15
The Big Three are Moody’s Investors Services, Inc. (Moody’s), Standard &
Poor’s Financial Services LLC, a subsidiary of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. (S&P),
and Fitch, Inc., Fitch Ratings Ltd., and its subsidiaries (Fitch). See infra Part III.A.3.
16
See Lawrence J. White, A New Law for the Bond Rating Industry, SEC. & INV.,
Spring 2007, at 52, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv30n1/v30n1-3.pdf
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participants will continue to rely on NRSRO ratings in the near
term irrespective of congressional action seeking to decrease
reliance on them.17
NRSRO Nullification, moreover, is realistic for at least
some subset of the regulated club, because Ratings Reform has
substantially increased the burdens of regulation vis-à-vis the
benefits.18 Indeed, this is precisely the reason some nonNRSROs have refrained from registering and some NRSROs
have stopped rating structured-finance products or curtailed
plans to expand.19 Since the NRSROs are only subjected to
Ratings Reform if they consent, there is a fragile equilibrium
that must be maintained between the benefits and burdens of
NRSRO status.20 The resolution of the two most critical
unresolved aspects of Ratings Reform—the Franken Proposal21
and the new standards of creditworthiness22—will impact this
equilibrium. To the extent the final form of these items
continues to increase NRSRO-specific burdens without
providing NRSRO-specific benefits, such measures could tip
the balance toward NRSRO Nullification, especially for the
seven smallest NRSROs.23
The final form of these items could also prevent NRSRO
Nullification if such items provide sufficient benefits to avoid
the tipping point. The Franken Proposal’s CRA Board,24 which
would act as both a “rater” of the NRSROs and an allocator of
(characterizing abandonment of the entire NRSRO regulatory regime as “an unrealistic
pipedream” that would nonetheless be a preferable solution).
17
See Claire A. Hill, Limits of Dodd-Frank’s Rating Agency Reform, 15 CHAP.
L. REV. 133, 144 (2011) (“[P]eople will continue to be influenced by the agencies . . . no
matter what the government does . . . . [So] it behooves government to make them
better if at all possible.”); see also 156 CONG. REC. S3955, 3956 (daily ed. May 19, 2010)
(statement of Sen. Al Franken) (“Here is the problem. Eliminating federally mandated
reliance on NRSRO credit ratings doesn’t change the fact that State laws, pension fund
policies, and other private market actors will still explicitly rely on NRSRO ratings.”).
18
For a description of how the benefits and burdens of NRSRO status have
changed over three different periods, see infra Part II.
19
See infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
20
Professor Coffee recently alluded to this problem by suggesting that the
Big Three might strategically abandon their NRSRO status to avoid the more
demanding provisions of Ratings Reform if the burdens were to outweigh the benefits.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text. I distinguish my claim by suggesting the
more likely problem is that the other seven NRSROs would surrender their NRSRO
status for precisely this reason while the Big Three would remain.
21
See infra Part III.A.1.
22
See infra Part III.A.2.
23
Based on today’s existing distinctions between NRSRO and non-NRSRO
status, it appears that the smallest seven would be more likely to opt out of the
regulatory regime than the Big Three. See infra Part III.A.3.
24
See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text (describing the mechanics of
the CRA Board).
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initial (but not secondary) rating assignments, is a potential
solution for keeping the NRSROs voluntarily regulated while
also maximizing accurate and reliable ratings. Through its rating
function, the CRA Board could provide a reliable signal to the
market about the best-performing NRSROs over time. If the new
standards of creditworthiness permit investment fiduciaries25 to
optionally rely on credit ratings, such a signal could significantly
influence the preferences that such fiduciaries have regarding
CRAs. Through its allocating function, the CRA Board could also
reward good performance with increased market share. While
both functions have the potential to create competition over
accuracy, the allocating function may be premature because
there is currently no definition of accuracy that the market
accepts. My central recommendation,26 which would only put into
place the Franken Proposal’s rating function, seeks to address
this problem as part of a broader goal of finding an optimal
mechanism to address both the rating-agency question and
NRSRO Nullification together.
While this article also considers closing the voluntary
registration loophole by having Congress adopt a mandatory
registration requirement as an alternate way to prevent or
reverse NRSRO Nullification,27 the article concludes that doing
so is not necessary if my central recommendation is adopted.28
There is also recent precedent demonstrating that the
NRSROs would be willing to foil Congress’s intent. As part of
Dodd-Frank, Congress sought to impose negligence exposure
under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 on the NRSROs
for misleading ratings disclosed in a registration statement.29
The NRSROs had historically not been subject to negligence—
only recklessness—because of a safe harbor, known as Rule

25

“Investment fiduciaries,” as used herein, means those persons (such as a
fund’s board of directors and investment advisor) responsible for determining
creditworthiness, whether or not under the new standards of creditworthiness, at their
respective institutions (e.g., broker-dealers, funds, banks, insurance companies, etc.).
26
See infra Part IV.
27
See infra Part III.B.
28
See infra Part IV.C.
29
See Dodd-Frank § 939G (“Rule 436(g) . . . shall have no force or effect.”); see
House-Senate Conference Committee Holds a Meeting on the Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, FIN. MARKETS REG. WIRE, June 15, 2010 (statement of Rep.
Mary Jo Kilroy) (“Included in the House offer is a simple commonsense proposal that
will help change this dynamic, a proposal that would nullify SEC Rule 436(g) and hold
all [CRAs] accountable under Section 11 liability, a standard which already covers
many experts in the financial world—accountants, auditors, lawyers, investment
bankers and the directors, officers and executives of the issuer.”).
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436(g), that shielded them from such exposure.30 Congress did
not, however, repeal the NRSROs’ existing right to withhold
consent to negligence exposure.31 Thus, the NRSROs
collectively withheld consent shortly after Dodd-Frank passed
and thereby nullified the intent of Congress.32 While it is
troubling that the NRSROs escaped negligence exposure in this
manner, NRSRO Nullification would pose a significantly larger
problem because it would allow an escape not just from
negligence exposure but from the entire regulatory regime.
While it would be headline news if the Big Three left the
regulated club, few words would likely be uttered if the other
seven surrendered their NRSRO status.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides
background to the rating-agency question by discussing what
credit ratings are and what it means for them to be inaccurate
when made. It then describes the debate over the rating-agency
question and the ultimate shape of Ratings Reform. Part II
examines the question of why a CRA would want to be an
NRSRO. It describes the benefits and burdens of being an
NRSRO prior to 2006 and in the aftermath of Congress’s two
recent attempts at Ratings Reform, the Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA)33 and Dodd-Frank.34 It shows that
being an NRSRO has become significantly less attractive over
time. Part III identifies and discusses the financial and
reputational implications that today’s most critical unresolved
items—the Franken Proposal and the new standards of
creditworthiness—will have on the NRSROs’ decision to
withdraw from Ratings Reform. It then assesses the impact that
today’s existing distinctions in concert with such unresolved
items will have on this decision and the legal implications of
NRSRO Nullification. This part also assesses the extent to
which such items and their alternatives will promote accurate
30

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g) (2009).
Securities Act of 1933 § 7(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77g(a) (West 2010) (“If . . . any
person [e.g., an NRSRO] whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him
[e.g., a credit rating], is named as having prepared or certified any part of the
registration statement . . . the written consent of such person shall be filed with the
registration statement.”).
32
See Ford Motor Credit Company LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, Item No. 1120
(Regulation AB) (Nov. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Ford No-Action Letter], available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2010/ford072210-1120.htm (“[T]he rating
agencies indicated that they were not willing to provide their consent . . . .”).
33
See CRARA, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327, 1329 (2006) (adding
Section 15E “Registration of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations”
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7).
34
Dodd-Frank, Title IX, Subtitle C.
31
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and reliable ratings. It concludes that certain proposals for
resolving these items would be more likely to tip the balance
toward NRSRO Nullification, while other proposals would be
more likely to prevent this result, and that the smaller seven are
more likely to opt out of Ratings Reform than the Big Three.
In Part IV, I present my central recommendation for
resolving the Franken Proposal and new standards of
creditworthiness in consonance with the dual goals of
promoting accurate and reliable ratings and preventing
NRSRO Nullification—adopt a refined version of the rating
function suggested by the Franken Proposal, but not the
allocating function. In addition, adopt the SEC’s current
proposal to permit partial reliance by investment fiduciaries on
any credit ratings under the new standards of creditworthiness
subject to one additional requirement: investment fiduciaries
seeking to rely on NRSROs that the rater deems good
performers must certify agreement with the rater’s
methodology for defining accuracy, while investment
fiduciaries seeking to rely on non-NRSROs or NRSROs that the
rater deems poor performers must publicly explain their
disagreement with the rater’s methodology or show why certain
non-NRSROs, when compared with NRSROs, produce ratings
of equal or better quality. Under this proposal, it will not be
necessary to close the voluntary registration loophole through a
mandatory registration requirement.
I.

THE RATING-AGENCY QUESTION

This part provides background to the rating-agency
question by discussing what credit ratings are and what it
means for them to be inaccurate when made. Then it describes
the debate over the rating-agency question and Congress’s
Ratings Reform solution.
A.

What Are Credit Ratings?

Credit ratings are letter- and number-based
assessments of risk that are “designed to measure and predict
the probability of default, or the expected loss . . . for an
individual debt obligation or for an obligor.”35 The ratings scales
35

U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED
STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS 9 (2011) [hereinafter SEC 2011 ANNUAL REPORT],
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency/nrsroannrep0111.pdf.
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typically range from triple-A (denoted by S&P and Fitch as
“AAA” and by Moody’s as “Aaa”)—which represents the least
risk of default—to C or D, which represents default or high
vulnerability to default.36 Ratings that fall within the four
highest categories assigned (typically “Baa3,” “BBB-” or higher)
are known as “investment grade,” while lower ratings are
known as non-investment grade (sometimes referred to as
speculative, high-yield, or junk). The chart on the following
page provides a comparison of the Big Three’s long-term credit
ratings for individual debt obligations.
The CRAs characterize these symbols as forwardlooking opinions37 and not as guarantees of future performance.
Moody’s states that the CRAs “do not predict which specific
bonds within a category are expected to default. Rather, credit
ratings communicate that the higher the rating category, the
lower the expected frequency of default.”38
Since ratings are predictions about future risk and are
not hard-and-fast facts, a credit rating should not be considered
inaccurate when made simply because the rated security
performed worse than expected. Good-faith predictions of
future risk frequently prove wrong.

36

See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., RATING SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS (2011),
available at http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_79004;
Credit Rating Definitions & FAQs, STANDARD & POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/
ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us (last visited Mar. 3, 2012); FITCH RATINGS, DEFINITIONS OF
RATINGS AND OTHER FORMS OF OPINION (2011), available at http://www.fitchratings.com/web_
content/ratings/fitch_ratings_definitions_and_scales.pdf.
37
See, e.g., Letter from Michel Madelain, Chief Operating Officer, Moody’s
Investor’s Serv., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (Dec. 14, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-09/s72509-5.pdf (“[R]atings are inherently
and completely forward-looking, rather than backward-looking, in nature.”).
38
Id. at 3. Moody’s compares its ratings to actuarial predictions made by life
insurance companies:
[A]n actuary would predict that, in the next five years, a 25 year-old nonsmoker will be less likely to die than an 80 year-old smoker; nonetheless, in
the next five years, some 25 year-old non-smokers will die, while some 80
year-old smokers will survive. Similarly, a rating analyst is predicting that a
Ba1 bond will be more likely to default than a Aaa bond; nonetheless, some
Aaa bonds will default, while most Ba1 bonds will not default.
Id. at 4.
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C

C
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39

See MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., supra note 36, at 4 (“Moody’s appends
numerical modifiers 1, 2, and 3 to each generic rating classification from Aa through
Caa. The modifier 1 indicates that the obligation ranks in the higher end of its generic
rating category; the modifier 2 indicates a mid-range ranking; and the modifier 3
indicates a ranking in the lower end of that generic rating category.”).
40
See STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 36 (“Ratings from ‘AA’ to ‘CCC’ may be
modified by the addition of a plus (+) or minus (-) sign to show relative standing within
the major rating categories.”).
41
See FITCH RATINGS, supra note 36 (“The modifiers ‘+’ or ‘-’ may be
appended to a rating to denote relative status within major rating categories.”).
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How Can a Credit Rating Be Inaccurate When Made?

Since any retrospective analysis comparing actual
defaults against before-the-fact predictions will show some level
of inaccuracy, one must distinguish between those ratings that
were inaccurate when made as a result of neglect or bad faith
and those ratings that were made in good faith at the outset but
only proved inaccurate as a result of naturally occurring market
forces. The available evidence identifies at least five different
scenarios when neglect or bad faith in the initial production of
ratings appears to have contributed to inaccurate ratings.
The first scenario involves the failure of rating analysts
to comply with or adhere to available procedures and
methodologies for producing credit ratings.42 For example, two
financial economists reported that the CRAs were regularly
making subjective adjustments in certain cases rather than
following consistent policies.43 They reported that “‘only 1.3% of
AAA CDOs closed between January 1997 and March 2007 met
the rating agency’s reported AAA default standard,’ with the
rest falling short.”44 They concluded that “the AAA tranches
should have been rated ‘as approximately BBB’ and that if the
AAA tranches in their sample of 916 CDOs were so
downgraded to BBB, the total overvaluation ‘cumulates to
$86.2 billion in cost to investors.’”45 This example suggests that
there was a systematic failure to comply with objective
procedures and methodologies for producing ratings. Many
other examples have also been alleged where the CRAs failed
to comply with their own models or failed to implement
existing models that would have produced more accurate, but
less issuer-friendly, ratings.46 As recently as September 2011,
42

See, e.g., John M. Griffin & Dragon Yongjun Tang, Did Subjectivity Play a Role
in CDO Credit Ratings?, J. FIN. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1364933; see also infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
43
See Coffee, supra note 1, at 242 (“[Credit rating agencies] did not follow a
consistent policy or valuation model with respect to subordination, but rather regularly
made ‘adjustments’ on subjective grounds.” (citing Griffin & Tang, supra note 42, at 17)).
44
Id. (quoting Griffin & Tang, supra note 42, at 4).
45
Id. (quoting Griffin & Tang, supra note 42, at 4-5).
46
See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Why Did the Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job
Rating Subprime Securities?, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 585, 593 (2010) (“[R]ather than
adjusting the ratings, they ‘fixed’ the model so the instruments could continue to ‘be’
AAA.”); see also Paul Lasell Bonewitz, Implications of Reputation Economics on
Regulatory Reform of the Credit Rating Industry, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 391, 394
(2010) (“[F]or years Standard & Poor’s (S&P) intentionally failed to implement a model
its executives knew more accurately reflected the risk of structured debt
products . . . .”).
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the SEC found that “[o]ne of the larger NRSROs reported that
it had failed to follow its methodology for rating certain assetbacked securities” and “[a]ll of the NRSROs failed to follow
their ratings procedures in some instances.”47
The second scenario involves the use of identical rating
symbols to express grossly different risks.48 In spite of years of
statistical evidence showing that different securities such as
corporate bonds and CDOs had grossly different default rates
across the same risk symbols, the CRAs did not seek to alert
investors to these differences in risk by using different
symbols. For example, two financial economists reported “that
the five year cumulative default rate on corporate bonds
receiving a ‘Baa’ rating from Moody’s between 1983 and 2005
was only 2.2%, but the same five year cumulative rate between
1994 and 2005 on CDOs with a Baa rating was 24%—a more
than ten to one disparity!”49 Similarly, during the financial
crisis of 2008, “[r]ating agencies gave triple-A ratings to 75% of
the $3.2 trillion subprime mortgages that lost sizable value
only months after the ratings were made.”50 Such triple-A
ratings signaled to investors a degree of safety commensurate
with U.S. treasury bonds. It is troubling that the CRAs used
the symbol associated with the benchmark of safe securities to
represent securities that proved to be, and perhaps should have
always been known to have been, significantly more risky.
The third and most often cited scenario involves the
existence of two inherent conflicts of interests: the issuer-pays
conflict and the ratings-shopping problem.51 The issuer-pays
47

See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2011 SUMMARY REPORT OF COMMISSION STAFF’S
EXAMINATIONS OF EACH NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATION 11,
13 (2011) [hereinafter SEC SEPT. 2011 SUMMARY REPORT], available at
http://sec.gov/news/studies/2011/2011_nrsro_section15e_examinations_summary_report.pdf.
48
See, e.g., Charles Calomiris & Joseph Mason, Reclaim Power from the Ratings
Agencies, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2007, 3:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fac2a61a51d9-11dc-8779-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1kay98gwj; see also Jess Cornaggia, Kimberly J.
Cornaggia & John E. Hund, Credit Ratings Across Asset Classes: A ≡ A? (Mar. 1, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909091 (testing whether
credit ratings contain the same information across asset classes and finding that, relative to
traditional corporate bonds, “municipal and sovereign bonds receive harsher ratings and
structured products receive more generous ratings”).
49
See Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: The Role of the Credit Rating
Agencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th
Cong. 5 (2008) [hereinafter Senate Turmoil Hearings] (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr.)
(citing Calomiris & Mason, supra note 48), available at http://banking.senate.gov/
public/_files/OpgStmtCoffeeSenateTestimonyTurmoilintheUSCreditMarkets.pdf.
50
Lynn Bai, The Performance Disclosures of Credit Rating Agencies: Are They
Effective Reputational Sanctions?, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 47, 48 (2010).
51
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 234. See generally Deryn Darcy, Note,
Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How the “Issuer Pays” Conflict
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conflict describes the business model where the issuer, rather
than the investor, pays the rating agency for a rating. The
ratings-shopping problem occurs where issuers shop privately
for preliminary (as opposed to final) ratings and award
business to the rating agency willing to give it the highest,
rather than the most accurate, final rating.52 Ample evidence
supports the notion that such inherent conflicts of interest put
unmanaged pressure on the CRAs to inflate ratings in order to
maintain their market share. For example, e-mails uncovered by
a Senate committee reveal that one Moody’s managing director
admitted that its behavior in terms of handing out triple-A
ratings for mortgage-backed securities made it “either
incompetent at credit analysis, or like we sold our soul to the devil
for revenue.”53 An S&P official said that its mortgage team had
“become so beholden to their top issuers for revenue [that] they
ha[d] developed a kind of Stockholm syndrome which they
mistakenly tag as customer value creation.”54 One UBS banker
warned S&P as follows: “Heard your ratings could be 5 notches
back of mo[o]dy’s equivalent. This is going to kill your [residential
business]. It may force us [UBS] to do moodyfitch only cdos [sic].”55
The fourth scenario involves the failure of the CRAs or
their proxies to do due diligence.56 Most cogently, Professor
Contributed and What Regulators Might Do About It, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 605;
156 CONG. REC. S3664, 3673 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Al Franken).
52
There is also a related conflict of interest associated with client
concentration. Issuances of asset-backed securities equaled and then subsequently
exceeded those of corporate bonds beginning in 2002 and “the top six underwriters [of
asset-backed securities] controlled over 50 percent of the mortgage-backed securities
underwriting market in 2007, and the top eleven underwriters each had more than 5
percent of the market and in total controlled roughly 80 percent of this very lucrative
market”; thus it becomes clear that a rating agency’s market share could be
significantly diminished if a small concentration of clients became unhappy and sought
to take business elsewhere. See Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of
Securities Markets: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 111th Cong. 55-56 (2009) [hereinafter Enhancing Investor Protection] (written
statement of John C. Coffee, Jr.). By contrast, for corporate bonds, whose ratings have
proven far more accurate, “no one client accounted for more than 1% of their business.”
See Coffee, supra note 1, at 237.
53
Gillian Tett, E-mails Throw Light on Murky World of Credit, FIN. TIMES
(Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a9da1aa4-508b-11df-bc86-00144feab49a.html#
axzz1RSKtZTp5.
54
Id.
55
See 156 CONG. REC. S3664, 3681 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Carl Levin).
56
See, e.g., John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide
Credit Crisis”: The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for
Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 170-71 (“Fitch explains that it ‘does not
audit or verify . . . or . . . perform any other kind of investigative diligence into the
accuracy . . . or completeness’ of the information it receives.” (citation omitted)); Darcy,
supra note 51, at 617 (“CRAs do not perform their own due diligence.”); Paul
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Coffee pointed out that CRAs were alone among financial
gatekeepers in that they did not conduct “factual verification
with respect to the information on which their valuation
models rely.”57 He explains that the problem is “that no
valuation model, however well designed, can outperform its
informational inputs; hence, use of unverified data results in
the well-known ‘GIGO Effect’—Garbage In, Garbage Out.”58
While the CRAs used to rely on due diligence firms to test the
creditworthiness of securitized mortgages, this practice mostly
ended after the year 2000 with the CRAs’ tacit approval.59
The fifth scenario involves “less-than-thorough business
practices.”60 According to the SEC, “[w]hen the firms didn’t have
enough staff to do the job right, they often cut corners.”61 A senior
analytical manager at one of the Big Three stated in an e-mail
that “[w]e do not have the resources to support what we are doing
now.”62 As the CRAs began expanding their coverage of issuances
and began taking on more complex instruments, resources to
produce each rating with integrity declined.63 At present, there is
a large disparity in staffing resources when comparing the Big
Three against the smaller seven NRSROs. While the Big Three
each employ over one thousand credit analysts and supervisors,
the smaller seven each employ considerably fewer.64

Justensen, Note, Ratings Recall: Will New Reform Proposals Make Lasting Impact?, 35
J. CORP. L. 193, 201 (2009) (“In 2008, critics again blamed CRAs for substandard due
diligence, particularly with respect to the failing mortgage-backed securities that
prompted the worldwide credit crisis.”).
57
See Coffee, supra note 1, at 244.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 241 (“[F]actual verification of the creditworthiness of securitized
mortgages largely disappeared after 2000, as investment banks and deal arrangers
ceased to pay for such activities, and the CRAs did not insist on their continuation.”).
60
See Hill, supra note 46, at 594 (citing OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS
& EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED
IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATINGS AGENCIES 2
(2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf).
61
Id. at 595 (citation omitted).
62
See FRANK PARTNOY, RETHINKING REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES:
AN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS PERSPECTIVE 5 (2009), available at http://www.cii.org/
UserFiles/file/CRAWhitePaper04-14-09.pdf.
63
See id. (“Rating agencies also began rating substantially greater numbers
of issuers and increasingly complex instruments. But the resources expended per
rating declined. As they expanded ratings to cover large numbers of structured finance
products, including tranches of various collateralized debt obligations, some NRSROs
neglected to divert resources to update rating models and methodologies or recruit
additional staff needed to ensure quality.”).
64
A.M. Best (120), DBRS (95), R&I (78), JCR (57), Morningstar (24), Kroll
(13), and Egan-Jones (5). See SEC SEPT. 2011 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 47, at 8.
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The Debate over the Rating-Agency Question

Billions, and sometimes trillions, of dollars have been
alleged to have been lost during the financial crisis of 2008.65
Congress’s account holds that inaccurate credit ratings misled
investors with respect to the level of risk they were assuming.66
Other accounts hold that sophisticated investors over-relied on
credit ratings and share equal blame for making the same
mistakes as the CRAs.67 Substantially all agree, however, that
inaccurate and unreliable credit ratings on structured finance
products68 were a root cause of the financial crisis of 2008.69

65

See 156 CONG. REC. S3664, 3673 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Al Franken) (“This conflict of interest has cost American investors and pensioners
billions of dollars because supposedly risk-free investments have failed or been
downgraded to junk status.”); see id. at S3675 (statement of Sen. George Lemieux) (“We
have a chance to address the issue of the rating agencies, because, but for their failure
to do their job, we may not have had this debacle that destroyed, as some estimate,
$600 trillion worth of wealth.”).
66
Congress found that,
[i]n the recent financial crisis, the ratings on structured financial products
have proven to be inaccurate. This inaccuracy contributed significantly to the
mismanagement of risks by financial institutions and investors, which in
turn adversely impacted the health of the economy in the United States and
around the world. Such inaccuracy necessitates increased accountability on
the part of the credit rating agencies.
See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 931(5), 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010).
67
See Hill, supra note 46, at 598 (explaining that both market participants and
rating agencies “drank the Kool-Aid”); see Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit
Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis 9 (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 09-015,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430653 (“Without overreliance on ratings,
investors would more likely have looked through the complexity of CDO and SIV
transactions to the underlying mortgage-backed securities, and prices would have more
accurately reflected market estimates of default probability, recovery, and correlation.”).
68
This phenomenon was limited to asset-backed securities (i.e., structured
finance products) and not other types of debt securities. See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 56,
at 170-71 (“Official reports on the crisis did not indicate that agencies did a poor job in
the corporate segment. Indeed, regulatory authorities’ studies drew a fundamental
distinction between agencies’ traditional and structured-finance ratings and criticized
only the latter.”); Coffee, supra note 1, at 236 (“The failure of the CRAs was largely
limited to structured financial products. Similar problems have not characterized the
ratings of corporate bonds.”).
69
See PARTNOY, supra note 62, at 13 (“[I]naccurate and unreasonable credit
ratings from NRSROs were a primary cause of the recent crisis. . . .”); see also Coffee,
supra note 1, at 232 (“Few disinterested observers doubt that inflated credit ratings
and conflict-ridden rating processes played a significant role in exacerbating the 2008
financial crisis.”); 156 CONG. REC. S3965, 3977 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Christopher Dodd) (“I agree with my colleagues that erroneous credit ratings on
asset backed securities played a central role in the financial crisis and that we need to
improve the regulation of credit ratings.”).
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The critics generally divide into two camps: the Free
Market Camp and the Reform Camp.70 A fundamental
difference between the two camps concerns their views over the
informational value of ratings, which influences how the camps
might ask and answer the rating-agency question.
The Free Market Camp believes that ratings have little
informational value and that better indicators of risk are
generally provided by market measures such as credit spreads
and credit-default-swap spreads.71 One study found that creditdefault-swap spreads incorporate new risk information more
quickly than credit ratings.72 While they acknowledge that
investors frequently rely on ratings to assess the riskiness of
their investments, they argue that this type of reliance is
misplaced. For these reasons, the Free Market Camp would
ask, do assessments of credit risk exist that are more accurate
and reliable than credit ratings?
The Reform Camp, on the other hand, believes that
ratings still provide valuable information about risk and that
such market measures do not provide a superior substitute,
especially in the case of complicated and obscure structured
finance products. They believe that CRAs are in a better
position than any other market actors to assess risk and that,
while blind reliance on ratings should be discouraged,
measured reliance is justified from an efficiency standpoint as
long as regulatory measures ensure that the incentives to
produce accurate and reliable ratings are properly aligned with
the CRAs’ interests. For these reasons, the Reform Camp
would ask, how can CRAs, including those who are NRSROs,
70

See Coffee, supra note 1, at 231 (“[R]eformers divide into two basic camps:
(1) those who see the ‘issuer pays’ model of the major credit ratings firms as the
fundamental cause of inflated ratings, and (2) those who view the licensing power
given to credit ratings agencies by regulatory rules requiring an investment grade
rating from an NRSRO rating agency as creating a de facto monopoly that precludes
competition.”).
71
A credit spread for a bond is the difference between a bond’s yield and the
yield of a comparable risk-free bond. Higher yields (and therefore wider credit spreads)
reflect the market’s view of the relative riskiness of such bond. Credit default swaps
are effectively insurance policies that investors can buy to protect themselves against
an entity’s default. Credit-default-swap spreads are equal to the premium on such
protection. For higher credit risks, the premium would be higher (and therefore the
spread would be wider) and vice versa. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of
Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U.
L.Q. 619, 624 (1999) [hereinafter Siskel & Ebert] (credit spreads); see also Mark J.
Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable
Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2088 (2009) [hereinafter Credit
Default Swap Spreads] (credit-default-swap spreads).
72
See generally Credit Default Swap Spreads, supra note 71.
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be encouraged through regulation to produce more accurate
and reliable credit ratings?
Professor Partnoy, the leading advocate for the Free
Market Camp, historically favored replacing references to
NRSRO credit ratings in statutes and regulations with marketbased measures such as credit spreads73 or credit-default-swap
spreads.74 To ease concerns about volatility, he suggested using
thirty-to-ninety day rolling averages of such spreads.75 He has
recently advocated, in light of SEC proposals, that a
professional judgment analysis taking into account multiple
factors including such market measures and credit ratings
could also be a viable substitute for sole reliance on NRSRO
credit ratings.76 He has long argued that references to NRSRO
credit ratings in statutes and regulations transformed the
NRSROs from providers of risk information to sellers of
“regulatory licenses.”77 Regulatory licenses are “the valuable
property rights associated with the ability of a private entity
[such as an NRSRO], rather than the regulator, to determine the
substantive effect of legal rules.”78 Since NRSROs were given this
quasi-governmental power in a wide variety of contexts, they
were effectively guaranteed continued business even if they
performed poorly.79 This partially explains the phenomenon of
widespread inaccurate credit ratings during the recent financial
crisis and previous crises. If statutes and regulations were to
require a different proxy for risk than NRSRO credit ratings,
this would remove the power of the NRSROs to grant regulatory
73

See Siskel & Ebert, supra note 71, at 704 (recommending credit spreads in
place of credit ratings).
74
See generally Credit Default Swap Spreads, supra note 71.
75
See PARTNOY, supra note 62, at 17 (“Investors concerned about the
volatility of market prices could use 30-day or 90-day rolling averages.”). In addition, to
ease concerns that market-based credit spreads would only be available after a market
for the bond has arisen, he has suggested “pre-issuance estimates of credit spreads (i.e.,
‘price talk’), in much the same way investors now rely on pre-issuance estimates of
credit ratings, which are not issued until the bonds are issued (credit spreads are
available at the same time).” See Siskel & Ebert, supra note 71, at 706 n.391.
76
See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 67, at 16 (advocating professional judgment
analysis to replace sole reliance on credit ratings that would include market measures,
such as credit spreads and swap spreads, as one factor of the analysis).
77
See PARTNOY, supra note 62, at 2. See generally Siskel & Ebert, supra note
71. For further discussion of the NRSRO’s “power to license” over time see infra Parts
II.A.2, II.B.2, and II.C.2.
78
Siskel & Ebert, supra note 71, at 623.
79
See PARTNOY, supra note 62, at 2 (“A regulatory license is a key that
unlocks the financial markets. Credit rating agencies profit from providing ratings that
unlock access to the markets, regardless of the accuracy of their ratings.”). Professor
Partnoy also criticizes, and makes suggestions to remedy, the lack of accountability of
the credit rating agencies and the lack of competition. See id. at 14-18.
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licenses and might cause the NRSROs to once again depend only
on their reputations to maintain business.80
Professor Coffee, the leading advocate for the Reform
Camp, disputes this view. He argues that credit ratings cannot
simply be replaced by credit spreads or other market measures,
and it is unrealistic to expect even sophisticated institutional
investors to do their own credit analysis in the context of
complex and opaque debt instruments such as CDOs.81 He
compares such “‘do-it-yourself’ financial analysis” to “‘do-ityourself’ brain surgery.”82 Under this view, NRSRO-dependent
regulatory licenses may actually improve the quality of ratings
to the extent they prevent investors from relying on unestablished (“fly-by-night”) CRAs instead of those with an
established track record. Regulatory licenses are viewed as
much less problematic since they do not alone explain the
dominance of the Big Three NRSROs. Such NRSROs were
dominant before NRSRO status was introduced in the 1970s and
have remained dominant since the expansion of the NRSRO club
from three to ten rating agencies.83 Professor Coffee argues that
the issuer-pays conflict of interest, rather than the relaxation of
high standards from the exploitation of regulatory licenses, is
the main impediment to accurate ratings.84 He also touches upon
the independent ratings-shopping problem that some accounts
treat as equally problematic.85 Professor Coffee argues that the
solution to the issuer-pays conflict must “either (1) divorce issuer
payment of the CRA from issuer selection of the CRA, or (2)
encourage (and implicitly subsidize) an alternative ‘subscriber
pays’ market for ratings.”86 Any solution adopted must realign
the incentives of the CRAs so that they are rewarded for
accuracy instead of issuer-friendly ratings: “if the incentives
80

See Siskel & Ebert, supra note 71, at 682 (“The regulatory license view is
quite simple. Absent regulation incorporating ratings, the regulatory license view
agrees with the reputational capital view: rating agencies sell information and survive
based on their ability to accumulate and retain reputational capital.”).
81
See Coffee, supra note 1, at 233.
82
Id.
83
See id. at 248. (“If licensing power alone could explain the dominance of the
Big Three, then the newer members of the SEC’s NRSRO club should be sharing in a
collective oligopoly.”).
84
Id. at 232-34.
85
Id. at 255; see also, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S3955, 3956 (daily ed. May 19,
2010) (statement of Sen. Al Franken) (“Right now, credit rating agencies have
incentives to hand out top AAA ratings to every product because they need to maintain
their business. If they hand out low ratings, issuers of financial products can go shop
around for a higher rating from a different rating agency.”).
86
Coffee, supra note 1, at 234.
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remain poorly aligned, regulatory oversight alone is unlikely to
ensure ratings accuracy.”87
D.

Congress’s Solution

While the debate over the rating-agency question has
been ongoing for over a decade, reform has often “seemed stuck
in an ever-repeating cycle of futility.”88 This came to an end in
2006 when Congress adopted the first leg of Ratings Reform,
known as CRARA. While CRARA contained certain free
market aspects such the NRSROs’ voluntary withdrawal
right,89 it did not heed the advice of the Free Market Camp to
rollback regulatory licenses. The clear purpose of CRARA was
to “improve ratings quality.”90 It sought to do so through a
narrowly tailored regulatory regime.
Unfortunately, much of the damage that CRARA sought
to prevent had already been done by the time it became
effective on June 26, 2007, and new problems were observed in
the financial crisis of 2008.91 As a result, Congress passed the
second leg of Ratings Reform in July 2010 as part of the DoddFrank Act. While Dodd-Frank builds on CRARA’s Reform
Camp architecture, it is a clearer compromise than CRARA
between the views of the two camps. It seeks to achieve the
Free Market Camp’s goal of decreasing reliance on ratings,
while at the same time pursuing measures to encourage
ratings to be more accurate and reliable.92 It seeks to do the
former by eliminating substantially all NRSRO regulatory
licenses on the federal level and replacing them with new
standards of creditworthiness by July 2012.93 It seeks to achieve
the latter through a multifaceted approach of heightened
regulation, accountability, and transparency.94 The crown jewel
of the Reform Camp approach, which has not yet been (and

87

Id. at 278.
Hill, supra note 17, at 133.
89
See supra notes 8, 33.
90
See CRARA, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006) (“An Act to improve
ratings quality for the protection of investors and in the public interest by fostering
accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating agency industry.”).
91
See supra note 66.
92
See Hill, supra note 17, at 143 (“The reform has two important goals. One is
to decrease reliance on ratings . . . . The other goal is to improve the quality of ratings.”).
93
See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 939-939A, 124 Stat. 1376, 1885-87
(2010).
94
See id. §§ 932-938.
88

2012]

NRSRO NULLIFICATION

1033

may not be) adopted, is known as the Franken Proposal.95 It is
intended to address the issuer-pays conflict and the ratingsshopping problem by creating a centralized board (the CRA
Board) controlled by investors to assign NRSROs to issuers
with respect to initial, but not secondary, ratings in order to
divorce issuer selection from issuer payment. The CRA Board
also would serve as a “rater” of at least some subset of the
NRSROs and would increase or decrease rating assignments
based on past performance. The SEC must adopt the Franken
Proposal or one of its alternatives after delivering its findings
and recommendations to Congress no later than July 2012.96
II.

WHY BE AN NRSRO?

This part examines the question of why a CRA would
want to be an NRSRO. It describes the benefits and burdens of
being an NRSRO prior to 2006 and in the aftermath of CRARA
and Dodd-Frank. It shows that being an NRSRO has become
significantly less attractive over time.
A.

Pre-2006

Before 2006, the CRAs placed a high value on NRSRO
status primarily because it afforded financial and reputational
benefits without any significant burdens. It conferred—among
other advantages—minimal competition because the club had
few members, captive business because of regulatory licenses,
and a shield against negligence exposure. These, in turn,
brought increased visibility and sent a signal to market that
NRSRO ratings had the government’s seal of approval as
proxies for safety and quality. Investment adviser regulation
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act),97
which also conferred some reputational benefits, was the only
burden of NRSRO status, and it was minimal.

95

See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings,
Exchange Act Release No. 64,456, at 49 (May 10, 2011) [hereinafter Solicitation of
Comment], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2011/34-64456.pdf (includes a
copy of the Franken Proposal’s proposed provisions in Section 15E(w) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 as an appendix [hereinafter the Franken Proposal], as those
provisions would have been added by Section 939D of H.R. 4173 (111th Congress), as
passed by the Senate on May 20, 2010).
96
See Dodd-Frank § 939F(d).
97
15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-6 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-71 (excluding P.L.
112-55 and 112-56)).
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1. The Exclusive Club
From the early 1900s, when the credit rating business
first took shape, through 1975, when NRSRO status was first
introduced by the SEC, the Big Three (or their predecessors)
were the primary issuers of credit ratings on debt securities.98
In 1975, the SEC recognized the Big Three as the original
NRSROs.99 While four additional CRAs were later admitted,
each of them was subsequently merged with or acquired by the
Big Three100 such that the club only comprised its original three
members as of January 2003.101
While two additional CRAs joined the club by March
102
2005, the recognition of new NRSROs was tightly controlled
by the SEC.103 “The single most important factor in the SEC
staff’s assessment . . . [was] whether the rating agency [was]
‘nationally recognized’ in the United States as an issuer of
credible and reliable ratings by the predominant users of
securities ratings.”104 As a result, new entrants faced a chickenand-egg dilemma in becoming NRSROs: “it [was] nearly
impossible to obtain clients [without] a track record for reliable
ratings, yet such a track record [was] difficult to generate
unless one first ha[d] clients.”105
While the SEC’s approach created a high barrier to entry
for those outside of the club, it made membership in the club more
valuable through exclusivity since fewer members meant less
competition. This was especially valuable in light of a market
norm by which issuers regularly sought two and sometimes three
ratings on an issuance of debt.106 By one estimate, Moody’s and

98

See SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 5. For a history of the NRSROs
during the twentieth century, see generally Siskel & Ebert, supra note 71.
99
See SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 8-9.
100
These firms were (1) Duff and Phelps, Inc.; (2) McCarthy Crisanti &
Maffei, Inc.; (3) IBCA Limited and its subsidiary, IBCA, Inc.; and (4) Thomson
BankWatch, Inc. Id. at 9.
101
Id. at 5.
102
See Dominion Bond Rating Service, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL
402819 (Feb. 24, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/
dominionbond022403-out.pdf; A.M. Best Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 711823
(Mar. 3, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/
am030305.htm.
103
See SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 9-10.
104
Id. at 9.
105
Coffee, supra note 1, at 234.
106
See Hill, supra note 46, at 590.
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S&P held “nearly 80 percent of the market”107 in 2006. Fitch
presumably held most of the balance.108 Many criticized this lack
of competition as lowering the quality of ratings.109
2. The Power to License
To distinguish safe securities from risky securities, the
SEC needed a measure of safety and quality. The NRSRO
concept was developed specifically for this purpose in 1975.110 In
the context of broker-dealer net capital requirements,111 the
SEC sought to encourage broker-dealers to hold “investment
grade” securities rather than “non-investment grade” securities
by permitting broker-dealers to subtract from their net worth a
smaller percentage (known as a haircut) for investment grade
securities.112 This allowed such broker-dealers the benefit of
disclosing a higher net capital figure. Since the NRSROs were
given the regulatory authority to determine the meaning of the
term “investment grade,” they were empowered to determine
the substantive effect of these rules—in the parlance of
Professor Partnoy, they were given the power to grant
“regulatory licenses.”113 As a result, market actors, such as
broker-dealers, became dependent upon NRSRO ratings in
making investment decisions.
After 1975, NRSRO credit ratings became widely
incorporated as proxies for safety and quality “in federal and state
legislation, rules issued by financial and other regulators, foreign
regulatory schemes, and private financial contracts.”114 For
example, they came to influence the holdings of money market

107

152 CONG. REC. E1957, 1957 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Brian
Carroll submitted by Rep. Fitzpatrick) (“[O]nly three NRSROs have staff No Action letters:
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch Inc., with the first two capturing nearly 80 percent of the market.”).
108
Id.
109
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H5255, 5255 (daily ed. June 28, 2005) (statement
of Rep. Fitzpatrick) (“Two firms dominate the ratings market with SEC approval and
this, Mr. Speaker, creates an uncompetitive marketplace, stifles competition from other
rating agencies, lowers the quality of ratings and allows conflicts of interest to go
unchecked. It is bad for the market and it is hurtful to individual investors.”).
110
See SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 5 (“Since 1975, the Commission has
relied on ratings by market-recognized credible rating agencies for distinguishing among
grades of creditworthiness in various regulations under the federal securities laws.”).
111
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2011).
112
See Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-64,352, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,550, 26,552-53 (Apr. 27, 2011) [hereinafter SEC
April 2011 Release].
113
See Siskel & Ebert, supra note 71, at 623.
114
See SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 6.
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funds,115 banks116 and insurance companies.117 They also allowed
issuers of registered securities not widely followed by the market
to use short-form registration statements instead of long forms.118
NRSRO-dependent laws and regulations created an
artificial demand in the market to obtain NRSRO credit
ratings, which meant guaranteed business for the NRSROs.
Commentators criticized this “regulatory licensing” power since
such guaranteed business did not reward accuracy, but only
membership in the NRSRO club: they were “insulated from the
standard market penalty for being wrong—the loss of
business.”119 As an illustrative example of the financial benefits
of such membership, as of December 31, 2006, Moody’s
reported net income of approximately $754 million120 and,
during that December, its market capitalization nearly peaked
at $19.32 billion.121
3. The Negligence Shield
In 1981, the SEC reversed a long-standing policy
prohibiting the disclosure of credit ratings in registration
statements because it believed such ratings would help
investors make informed investment decisions about the level
of risk they would assume.122 Such disclosure, however, would
have made the NRSROs “experts” under the Securities Act of
1933, which would subject their ratings to negligence exposure
under Section 11. Since this would have imposed a higher
liability standard on the NRSROs in the context of the sale of
115

See Investment Company Act Rule 2a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2010).
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831e(d)(4)(A) (West 2010).
117
See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 1192.10 (2010).
118
See, e.g., Form S-3, 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (2010).
119
See Calomiris & Mason, supra 48; see also Frank Partnoy, How and Why
Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS:
CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 60-61 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds.,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=900257 (In a minimally competitive
environment, such regulatory licenses may therefore be responsible for “generat[ing]
economic rents for NRSROs that persist even when they perform poorly and otherwise
would lose reputational capital.”).
120
See Moody’s Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 27 (Feb. 25, 2011)
[hereinafter Moody’s 2010 Annual Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1059556/000119312511047974/d10k.htm#tx1118549_23.
121
See Moody’s Corporation Historical Market Cap Data, YCHARTS,
http://ycharts.com/companies/MCO/historical_data/market_cap?start_month=1&start_
day=29&start_year=2005&end_month=1&end_day=29&end_year=2012 (last visited
Feb. 14, 2012). Moody’s market capitalization reached a peak of $20.81 billion on
March 31, 2006. See id.
122
Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration Statements, Securities Act
Release No. 6336, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,024 (Aug. 18, 1981) [hereinafter 1981 Release].
116
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registered debt securities than it would have in any other
context,123 the NRSROs informed the SEC that they would not
consent to such disclosure.124
Since the SEC was comfortable that the antifraud
rules125 would be sufficient to hold the NRSROs accountable for
reckless behavior,126 it created a shield to protect NRSRO credit
ratings disclosed in registration statements from negligence
exposure in order to encourage disclosure of such ratings. NonNRSROs, by contrast, would not benefit from such a shield and
would therefore need to consent to negligence exposure for
ratings disclosed in a registration statement. This gave the
NRSROs a considerable competitive advantage over all other
CRAs. Commentators cited this benefit as evidence that the
NRSROs were held to a lower standard than other comparable
gatekeepers such as lawyers, auditors, and even other CRAs.127
4. The Seal of Approval
Because the SEC only allowed a small group of
“nationally recognized” CRAs into the club and only gave such
CRAs the power to license and a negligence shield, it increased
the visibility of these CRAs and sent a signal to the market
123

CRAs generally have First Amendment protection from common law
negligence claims because credit ratings are thought to constitute a form of speech that
is of public concern and therefore entitled to the highest form of protection. See, e.g.,
Approaches to Improving Credit Rating Agency Regulation: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Gov’t, 111th Cong. 1-2 (2009) (statement
of Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law), available
at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/volokh.pdf. Under this
standard, rating agency speech is protected unless a rating is made with actual malice,
meaning “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.” See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Some have
indicated that the actual malice standard equates to the scienter element of a Rule
10b-5 claim, but that a state of mind of negligence is not enough. See, e.g., Letter from
Laurence H. Tribe & Thomas C. Goldstein, Legal Consultants to Moody’s Investors
Serv., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 14, 2009), available at
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-09/s72409-13.pdf.
124
See 1981 Release, supra note 122, at 42,027 n.27.
125
See id. at 42,025 & n.1. (“[T]he rating organization would continue to be
subject to liability under the antifraud provisions of the Federal securities laws. . . . See,
e.g., Section 17(a) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. 77q(a)); Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78j(b)) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder (17 CFR 240.10b-5);
and Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-6).”).
126
See PARTNOY, supra note 62, at 14 (“Rating agencies have been sued
relatively infrequently, and rarely have been held liable.”).
127
See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 119, at 83-84 (“The unique problems
associated with [NRSROs] as gatekeepers stem from . . . their lack of exposure to civil
and criminal liability. Unlike other gatekeepers, [NRSROs] are explicitly immune to
prosecution for certain violations of securities law, including section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 . . . .”).

1038

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:3

that their ratings could be relied upon as proxies for safety and
quality in consonance with their regulatory functions. Some
interpreted this signal as conferring governmental approval on
the quality of debt securities, much like a USDA Grade A seal
would signify the quality of meat products to consumers.128 NonNRSROs, in particular, argued that the “lack of NRSRO status
substantially hindered their businesses’ rate of growth
[since] . . . the marketplace views the NRSRO designation as
the equivalent of the ‘Good Housekeeping Seal Of Approval.’”129
By this account, the government would be responsible
for the brand name status of the Big Three. By other accounts,
however, NRSRO status itself would not be responsible for
such reputational benefits because the Big Three dominated
the industry long before NRSRO status came into being. These
accounts would attribute the stature of the Big Three to the
“reputational capital”130 they acquired over time after being first
movers in the industry.131
In the absence of informative disclosure, moreover, the
SEC had no meaningful mechanism during this period to
actually test the accuracy and reliability of the NRSROs’
output. So the reputations of the NRSROs were not based on
objective performance measures but merely on industry
perceptions. The SEC noted in 2003 that “[w]ithout such an
assurance as to the quality of the ratings issued by a rating
agency, it would be foolhardy to rely upon ratings as a proxy for
credit quality in regulation.”132 Yet, national recognition—and
not accurate performance—was the primary qualifying
attribute for attaining NRSRO status, and investors relied
accordingly on NRSRO ratings as a shorthand for risk. Those
outside of the club were excluded from this benefit.

128

See Siskel & Ebert, supra note 71, at 684-86.
SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 38.
130
Reputational capital is a metaphor for the value that a company’s
reputation has in generating future business. Since a CRA’s reputation and ability to
maintain future business are on the line each time it issues a rating, the CRA is said to
be pledging its reputational capital to generate the confidence of investors. See
generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2006) (stating the reputational capital view and recognizing its limits).
131
See Coffee, supra note 1, at 263 (“Their supremacy thus seems more based on
‘first mover’ advantages and the difficulty of entering the field without a proven track
record. If, as widely assumed, economies of scale characterize the production of financial
information, the first entrant can operate more efficiently and exclude later entrants.”).
132
SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 38.
129
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5. Investment Adviser Regulation
Investment adviser regulation under the Advisers Act
imposed the sole burden on NRSRO status during the pre-2006
period. Its duties, not narrowly tailored to NRSROs, included
filing Form ADV,133 recordkeeping requirements, and periodic
examinations.134 While the NRSROs were purportedly subject to
the same duties as all other investment advisers, they viewed
their registrations as voluntary135 and thought that certain
requirements such as the recordkeeping rules did not apply to
them.136 The SEC generally acquiesced to this view.137 This in
turn hampered the SEC’s ability to perform meaningful
examinations and led the agency to characterize the NRSROs
as not subject to much “formal regulation or oversight.”138
Advisers Act regulation, however, did confer one benefit: it sent
a message to the market that NRSROs were regulated entities
whether or not the SEC was really watching them.139

133

Form ADV required NRSROs to disclose, among other things, information
about its advisory business and other business activities, financial industry affiliations,
participations or interests in client transactions, disciplinary history, owners and executive
officers, and the locations of books and records. It did not require any disclosures specifically
tailored to NRSROs such as the disclosure of procedures and methodologies, performance
data, rating action histories, or a description of the data relied on when forming ratings
opinions. See, e.g., Moody’s Inv. Servs., Form ADV (Feb. 2005), available at
http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/%28S%282ztk5wovxx43l2wyi11rpdaf%29%29/iapd/content/
viewform/adv022005/sections/iapd_AdvIdentifyingInfoSection.aspx?ORG_PK=111146&RGL
TR_PK=&STATE_CD=&FLNG_PK=0588E7BC000801480305C5F0024CBAAD056C8CC0.
134
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 2009 WL 86761,
§ 21.1 at 1 (2009).
135
See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 208, 211 (1985). The Lowe majority held
that a publisher of nonpersonalized investment advice that was circulated broadly to
the public fell into an exclusion from the defined term “investment adviser.” The reason
was that the “publications [did] not fit within the central purpose of the Act because
they [did] not offer individualized advice attuned to any specific portfolio or to any
client’s particular needs.” Id.
136
See SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 20 (“[T]he effectiveness of the
Commission’s examination being hampered by, among other things, the lack of
recordkeeping requirements tailored to NRSRO activities, the NRSROs’ assertions that the
document retention and production requirements of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
are inapplicable to the credit rating business, and their claims that the First Amendment
shields the NRSROs from producing certain documents to the Commission.”).
137
Memorandum from Ann Nazareth, Dir., Sec. Exch. Comm’n Div. of Mkt.
Regulation, to William Donaldson, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 5 (June 3, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/ratingagency/baker060403.pdf.
138
See SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 4.
139
See HAZEN, supra note 134 (describing phenomenon in 1985 that entities
such as the NRSROs could have deregistered as investment advisers after the Supreme
Court’s holding in Lowe: “Presumably, these publishers believed it would add to their
credibility to be able to state that they were registered with the SEC.”).
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Post-CRARA (2006–2010)

After the passage of CRARA in 2006, the ratio of benefits
to burdens with respect to the NRSROs began to shift. Between
2006 and 2010, the NRSRO club doubled in size, the NRSROs’
power to license began to marginally diminish, and the SEC
considered repealing—but ultimately did not repeal—the
NRSROs’ negligence shield. Congress and the SEC also took
measures to negate the perception that such credit ratings had
the government’s seal of approval. While these measures did
little to alter the financial and reputational benefits of NRSRO
status (especially for the Big Three), the introduction of NRSRO
regulation, which conferred some reputational benefits, added
significant new legal burdens to all of the NRSROs.
1. The Expanding Club
In light of critiques regarding the exclusive nature of
the NRSRO club, Congress sought to make entry easier
through objective standards that relied more on the judgment
of investors than on the judgment of the SEC.140 As a proxy for
such investors, Congress required certifications from at least
ten nonaffiliated qualified institutional buyers that used such
ratings for at least three years.141 Nonetheless, no mechanism
was put into place to actually test the accuracy and reliability
of the NRSROs’ output. By December 2007, the NRSRO club
doubled to ten.142
In addition, Congress adopted other measures to foster
competition. For example, it adopted new performance
disclosure requirements to permit the market to compare the
performance of different NRSROs143 and an Equal Access Rule
to give lesser established NRSROs an equal opportunity to rate
structured finance products by requiring issuers to provide the

140

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(62), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(62) (2006).
See id. § 15E(a)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(C).
142
See Commission Orders Granting NRSRO Registration, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency.htm (last visited June
20, 2011). The new members were R&I, JCR, Kroll (the successor to LACE Financial Corp.),
Morningstar (the successor to Realpoint LLC) and Egan-Jones. As of August 10, 2011, no
additional credit rating agencies have been admitted to the club. Jeannette Neumann, Call
to Downsize Giants of Ratings, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 10, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424053111904480904576498493884494956.html?mod=ITP_moneyandinvesting_0
#articleTabs%3Darticle.
143
See Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59,342 (Feb. 2, 2009).
141
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same information to hired and non-hired NRSROs.144 Since the
Equal Access Rule is NRSRO-specific, it represents a new
benefit of NRSRO status.145
Nonetheless, as of year-end 2010, there had not yet been
any tangible impact on competition: the Big Three still issued
approximately 97 percent of all outstanding ratings across all
categories reported,146 and in the structured finance product
realm, they issued approximately 94 percent of all outstanding
ratings.147 Some studies, moreover, suggested that greater
competition was inadvertently producing a race to the bottom,148
possibly as a result of the issuer-pays conflict and ratingsshopping problem.
2. The First Licensing Rollbacks
In response to criticism over the NRSROs’ power to
license, the SEC put out three proposals in July 2008 to amend
and replace NRSRO-dependent regulatory licenses.149 These
proposals included dismantling regulatory licenses with respect
to broker-dealers, funds, and issuers of registered securities.
While six commentators supported the proposals, the majority
of commentators opposed them.150

144

17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(a)(3) (2011); see also SEC 2011 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 35, at 18 (“[The Equal Access Rule] allow[s] non-hired NRSROs to access
information relating to the issuance of structured products that was previously only
readily available to hired NRSROs. An NRSRO may then be able to break into the
structured finance sector by providing unsolicited ratings on these securities. This
would also allow market participants to see differences between credit ratings issued
by a non-hired NRSRO and those issued by hired NRSRO and to observe, over time,
the differences in the quality of the ratings.”).
145
At present, the Equal Access Rule is being considered as a potential
alternative to the Franken Proposal. See infra Part III.A. In fact, the majority of
commentators on the Franken Proposal prefer enhancing the Equal Access Rule
instead of adopting the Franken Proposal. See infra text accompanying notes 184-87.
146
See SEC SEPT. 2011 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 47, at 6-7.
147
Id. at 6.
148
See, e.g., Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, How Did Increased Competition
Affect Credit Ratings? 36 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Fin., Working Paper No. 09-051, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1278150 (claiming that increased competition
from Fitch coincided with lower quality ratings from Moody’s and S&P).
149
See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 58,070, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,088 (July 1, 2008);
Security Ratings, Securities Act Release No. 8940, Exchange Act Release No. 58,071
(July 1, 2008); References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 58,070 (July 1, 2008).
150
See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 60,789, Investment Company Act Release
No. 28,940 (Oct. 5, 2009) [hereinafter SEC October 2009 Release].
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As a result, the SEC left all NRSRO regulatory licenses
in place except for one: a rule known as the municipal
securities exception to the affiliated underwriter prohibition.151
This first licensing rollback foreshadowed the SEC’s proposed
approach to the new standards of creditworthiness in the postDodd-Frank period by replacing a fund’s reliance on an
NRSRO’s determination of “investment grade” with the
professional judgment of its board.152 Since the NRSROs’
regulatory licensing benefit remained substantially intact
during this period, substantive damage to the NRSROs cannot
be attributed to this rollback. The financial crisis, however,
took its toll. As of December 31, 2010, Moody’s reported net
income of $508 million (down approximately 33 percent from
December 31, 2006),153 and its market capitalization reached a
low of $4.72 billion (down approximately 77 percent from its
peak) in June 2010.154
3. The Negligence Proposals
In light of criticism that the NRSROs were held to a
lower standard than similarly situated gatekeepers such as
lawyers, auditors, and other CRAs,155 the SEC issued two
releases that together would have repealed the negligence
shield for NRSROs and required the disclosure of their credit
ratings.156 This would have forced the NRSROs to consent to
151

17 C.F.R. 270.10f-3 (2008). The old NRSRO-dependent rule prohibited
registered funds from knowingly purchasing municipal securities from an affiliated
underwriter unless they were determined by an NRSRO to be investment grade. See
SEC October 2009 Release, supra note 150, at 23-24.
152
See infra Part II.C.2.
153
See Moody’s 2010 Annual Report, supra note 120, at 27; see also Moody’s
2006 Annual Report, supra note 120, at 20.
154
See Moody’s Corporation Historical Market Cap Data, supra note 121.
155
See, e.g., Concept Release on the Possible Rescission of Rule 436(g) Under
the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 9071, Exchange Act Release No. 60,798,
Investment Company Act Release No. 28,943 (Oct. 7, 2009) (“NRSROs describe the
credit ratings that they provide as opinions with respect to the registrant or security of
the registrant, and the Commission notes that other professionals provide opinions
upon which investors rely, such as legal opinions, valuation opinions, fairness opinions
and audit reports, and we treat these opinions as subject to the Securities Act’s
provisions for experts, including our requirements that registrants include the consents
of such professionals if their reports are referenced in registration statements. It
appears to us that NRSROs and other credit rating agencies are experts similar to
other parties subject to liability under Section 11 and that it may no longer be
consistent with investor protection to exempt NRSROs from the provisions of the
Securities Act applicable to experts.”).
156
Id.; see also Credit Ratings Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9070,
Exchange Act Release No. 60,797, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,942 (Oct. 7,
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negligence exposure with respect to their ratings, much as
auditors must do with respect to audited financial statements.
To the extent that no NRSRO would be willing to consent,
however, issuers would not be able to issue registered bonds.157
Many commentators warned that this would shut down the
registered bond market and would likely have a number of other
collateral consequences.158 Fitch pointed out that forced exposure
to a negligence standard would defeat the purpose of being an
NRSRO.159 While the majority of commentators expressed an
increased willingness to hold the CRAs accountable for their
mistakes, most were divided on the utility of this particular set
of proposals. To date, the SEC has not acted on it.
4. Attempts to Negate the Seal of Approval
Other criticism suggested that investors placed too
much reliance on NRSRO credit ratings.160 As a result, Congress
and the SEC took measures to change the market perception of
NRSRO credit ratings. Congress prohibited any representation
or implication that any NRSRO “has been designated,
sponsored, recommended, or approved, or that the abilities or
qualifications thereof have in any respect been passed upon, by
the United States or any agency, officer, or employee thereof.”161
The SEC likewise implemented a number of rules to
cosmetically remove nonsubstantive references to NRSRO
2009) (discussing proposal that would have replaced the current permissive disclosure
standard for ratings with a required disclosure standard).
157
If credit ratings were required to be disclosed and the CRAs refused
consent, issuers would not have been able to issue registered bonds because their
registration statements would have contained an omission of a material fact required
to be stated therein. This would have subjected such issuers to Section 11 liability.
158
Commentators warned of the following collateral consequences, among
others: a migration from registered deals to unregistered deals (e.g., 144A deals), a
contraction in ratings coverage, and less accurate defensive ratings due to incentives
favoring caution rather than candor. See, e.g., Letter from Robert E. Buckholz, Jr.,
Chair, & Trevor Ogle, Sec’y, Comm. on Sec. Regulation, N.Y.C. Bar to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 1, 2010); Letter from Deven Sharma,
President, Standard & Poor’s to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Dec.
14, 2009); Letter from Michel Madelain, Chief Operating Officer, Moody’s Investors
Servs. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 14, 2009), all available
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-09/s72409.shtml.
159
See Letter from Charles D. Brown, General Counsel, Fitch Ratings, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 14, 2009) (“The proposal seems to
defeat the entire purpose of becoming an NRSRO if one of the perceived benefits of
recognition (use of the credit ratings by registrants) creates a significant new liability.”).
160
See, e.g., SEC October 2009 Release, supra note 150, at 1 (“NRSRO ratings
in Commission rules may have contributed to an undue reliance on those ratings by
market participants.”); Partnoy, supra note 67, at 1.
161
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(f)(1) (2006).
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ratings in statutes and regulations.162 Its initiative explicitly
sought to negate the perception of a seal of approval.163
The market, however, did not change any of its previous
habits due to these signals to stop over-relying on NRSRO
ratings, nor did it punish the Big Three in light of the
widespread negative media attention focused on them during
the financial crisis of 2008. The Wall Street Journal pointed out
that “[the Big Three’s] dominance of the business didn’t change
after they lost some credibility for being overly optimistic about
the performance of thousands of mortgage-related bonds before
and during the financial crisis.”164 It also remarked that the
market continued to ignore the judgments of lesser established
NRSROs such as Egan-Jones.165 Some attribute this
phenomenon to “sticky” market practices, which refers to the
strong incentives that market participants have to honor
existing market norms, such as relying on the Big Three’s
credit ratings, even if they appear to be performing poorly.166
While some may also attribute the phenomenon to the
continued dependence on NRSRO regulatory licenses during
this period, this does not explain why the other seven NRSROs
had so little success in increasing their market share in
relation to the Big Three. The most convincing reason for the
phenomenon is that “no other ratings firm[s] can come close to
matching the number of analysts, broad coverage and decades
of experience.”167 Thus, just as the failure of the Big Three
during the financial crisis of 2008 did not impact their market
share, attempts to negate the government’s seal of approval
162

These changes were in addition to the aborted proposals to remove
regulatory licenses from SEC regulations and the first licensing rollback discussed
above. See SEC October 2009 Release, supra note 150, at 11-14. An example of such a
cosmetic change was the test to determine whether an Alternative Trading System
(ATS) must be registered as an exchange. This test previously depended upon the
number of investment grade and non-investment grade corporate debt securities
trading on the ATS. The SEC consolidated these two categories into “corporate debt
securities” to remove the superfluous “investment grade” distinction. See id. at 7-9.
163
Id. at 36 (The SEC stated that the “initiative [was] designed to address the
concern that the inclusion in the Commission’s rules and forms of requirements
relating to security ratings could create the appearance that the Commission had, in
effect, given its ‘official seal of approval’ on ratings, which could adversely affect the
quality of due diligence and investment analysis . . . .”).
164
Neumann, supra note 142.
165
Id.
166
Hill, supra note 17, at 144 (“Market practices are sticky, and market actors
have strong incentives to abide by them. Even now, after Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s,
and Fitch have done so badly, and when other rating agencies are NRSROs, the Big
Three are still highly influential.”).
167
Neumann, supra note 142.
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had no substantive impact on the Big Three’s market share and
no positive effect on the growth of the smaller seven.
5. NRSRO Regulation
In light of the SEC’s inability to regulate and oversee
the NRSROs under the Advisers Act, Congress adopted a new,
narrowly tailored regulatory regime for NRSROs. NRSRO
regulation imposes substantial new legal burdens on the
NRSROs without providing any substantive NRSRO-specific
benefits. The new legal burdens include new disclosure
obligations,168 recordkeeping rules,169 prohibitions on unfair
business practices,170 management of certain conflicts of
interest,171 prohibition of other conflicts of interest,172 and new
and enhanced SEC penalty and examination powers.173
Although the new regulatory regime also provides some
new legal benefits, such benefits do not bear on the NRSRO
Nullification analysis. Two of these benefits were designed to
apply equally to all CRAs: protection from SEC or State
regulation of the substance of credit ratings and the procedures
and methodologies used to determine them,174 and protection
168

Such disclosure obligations include the disclosure of performance statistics,
procedures and methodologies, and permitted conflicts of interest. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15E(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78o-7(a)(1)(B), (a)(3) (West
2011). Rules were also adopted requiring disclosure of rating action histories for all
credit ratings initially determined on or after June 26, 2007. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g2(d)(3) (2011). On a confidential basis, NRSROs must disclose, among other things, a
list of their twenty largest clients and various financial statements. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15E(a)(1)(B)(viii), (k), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(viii), (k).
The SEC requires such disclosures to be made using Form NRSRO, which must be
made publicly available on such NRSRO’s website. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-1 (2011)
[hereinafter Form NRSRO].
169
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2.
170
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(i), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(i); see
also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-6.
171
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(h), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(h); see
also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17g-5(a), (b).
172
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(h); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c).
173
The SEC has the power to penalize the NRSROs in that they could lose
their NRSRO status or be censured, limited, or suspended if they commit one or more
enumerated bad acts, including securities laws violations or felonies, or if they fail to
maintain adequate financial and managerial resources to consistently produce credit
ratings with integrity. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o7(d). These powers are in addition to their general powers under the Exchange Act.
See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 21, 21A, 21B, 21C, 32, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78u,
78u-1, 78u-2, 78u-3, 78ff. The SEC also has examination authority over all records of
NRSROs. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 17(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78q.
174
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)
(“Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, or any other provision of law,
neither the Commission nor any State (or political subdivision thereof) may regulate
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against private rights of action (now repealed).175 The other
benefits include an exemption for the NRSROs from
registration under the Advisers Act176 and the NRSROs’
voluntary withdrawal right together with the CRAs’ voluntary
registration right.177 The former does not bear on NRSRO
Nullification because the SEC has long treated NRSRO
registrations as voluntary under the Advisors Act and
continues to treat non-NRSRO registrations in the same
manner. While the latter permits NRSRO Nullification, it does
not, by itself, affect the decision to opt in or out of the
regulatory regime. Since this regime is NRSRO-specific,
however, regulation under the new regime continues to confer
the same, if not an enhanced, reputational benefit as regulation
under the Advisers Act did. The new NRSRO-specific legal
burdens, on the other hand, impose new costs that weigh in
favor of NRSRO Nullification.
C.

Post-Dodd-Frank (2010–Present)

After the passage of Dodd-Frank in July 2010, most of
the distinct financial benefits of NRSRO status from the
previous eras were called into question or removed: the club
was no longer exclusive, measures were proposed to increase
competition, the power to license was set to be substantially
eliminated on the federal level by July 2012, and the
negligence shield was repealed (though, as described herein,
negligence exposure was not imposed). In addition, the legal
burdens of NRSRO status were again increased substantially
through heightened regulation. In spite of reputational damage
from the financial crisis of 2008, the Big Three’s credibility
nonetheless appeared to remain mostly intact while the
the substance of credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies by which any
nationally recognized statistical rating organization determines credit ratings.”).
175
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(m), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(m)
(West 2008), amended by Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 933(a), 124 Stat. 1376,
1883 (2010). Dodd-Frank’s amendment to section 15E(m) repealed the NRSROs’
protection against private rights of action granted under CRARA, which previously
read as follows: “Nothing in this section may be construed as creating any private right
of action, and no report furnished by a nationally recognized statistical rating
organization in accordance with this section or section 17 shall create a private right of
action under section 18 or any other provision of law.” Id.
176
See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(11)(F), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b2(11)(F) (West 2011) (explicitly exempting NRSROs from the definition of investment
adviser but not CRAs).
177
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(e)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(e)(1);
id. § 15E(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(a).
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opinions of the other seven NRSROs continued to be mostly
ignored. It remains to be seen how the two most critical
unresolved items—the Franken Proposal and the new
standards of creditworthiness—will impact this calculus once
they are finalized.
1. The Prospect of a New Elite Club
Since expanding the NRSRO club and other initial
measures to foster competition among the NRSROs did not
produce tangible results, Congress instead began focusing on a
different strategy to increase competition: encouraging the
existing members of the club to compete over accuracy. The
leading proposal, which has not yet been (and may not be)
adopted, is the Franken Proposal.178 This proposal seeks to
increase competition among the existing members of the club
by creating an environment where all NRSROs compete over
accuracy on a level playing field without having to inflate their
ratings to win business.179 It purports to do this by creating a
series of benefits that only accrue to a new elite club for which
only NRSROs would be eligible. The members of the new elite
club would be known as qualified NRSROs (QNRSROs).180 To
join this new elite club and get these benefits, NRSROs would
have to be selected by the investor-controlled CRA Board.181 The
CRA Board would rate the QNRSROs based on their track
records for accuracy and reward the best performers, over time,
with the most business.182 This would purportedly encourage a
race to the top to issue accurate ratings instead of today’s race
to the bottom to assign issuer-friendly ratings.183

178

See supra note 95.
See 156 CONG. REC. S3664, 3676 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Charles Schumer) (“[T]he provision Senator Franken is offering and I am proud to
cosponsor goes to the heart of the conflict of interest. . . . [T]he smaller rating agencies and
investor-paid agencies will have a level playing field to compete against the big three.”).
180
See Franken Proposal, supra note 95, § 15E(w)(1)(B).
181
While this new membership requirement creates a new barrier to entry, it
appears that such barrier is meant to be exceedingly low to weed out only those
NRSROs that are simply unqualified to rate structured finance products. Senator
Franken has been clear that one of the express purposes of his proposal is to give the
smaller NRSROs a level playing field to compete with the Big Three. See 156 CONG.
REC. S3664, 3674 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Al Franken) (“Standard &
Poor’s and Moody’s and Fitch do about, what, 94 percent of the business. The other
agencies will get a chance because what will be rewarded is accuracy.”).
182
See Franken Proposal, supra note 95, § 15E(w)(5).
183
For an analysis of the Franken Proposal and recommendations for
improving it, see infra Parts III.A.1.b.I and IV.A.
179
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The SEC is also considering five alternative proposals to
the Franken Proposal to create incentives for NRSROs to
compete over accuracy. These proposals include relying only on
the existing Equal Access Rule; creating an investor-owned
NRSRO to compete with the existing issuer-paid NRSROs;
requiring the price-tag for ratings to be split between issuers,
secondary market sellers, and investors; legally mandating a
user-pays system; and preserving the issuer-pays model but
putting the payment decision into the hands of security
holders.184 These proposals vary with respect to the allocation of
new NRSRO-specific benefits and burdens.185 Of these, the large
majority of commentators support relying only on the existing
Equal Access Rule with certain enhancements, even though no
NRSRO has yet used it,186 while a smaller segment favors
implementing a form of the Franken Proposal.187 None of the
other alternatives appear to have gained much traction.
Congress ordered the SEC to study the Franken
Proposal and alternative systems and deliver a report by July
2012 with their recommendations.188 After delivering the report,
to the extent necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors, the SEC must establish an
assignment system for selecting NRSROs to determine initial
credit ratings for structured finance products that prevents the
issuer and other issuer-aligned parties from selecting the
NRSRO that will determine and monitor initial credit ratings.189
It must implement the Franken Proposal unless it determines
184
185

See Solicitation of Comment, supra note 95, at 38-47.
For an analysis of the alternatives to the Franken Proposal, see infra Part

III.A.1.b.
186

See Letter from Robert Dobilas, President, Morningstar Credit Ratings LLC,
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 6 (Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter
Morningstar Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/4629-24.pdf (“Since
the [Equal Access Rule] became effective, we know of no NRSRO that has issued an
unsolicited initial rating as a result of the information available under this rule.”).
187
See generally Comments on Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on
Assigned Credit Ratings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/comments/4629/4-629.shtml (last visited Jan. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Comments on Solicitation].
188
See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939F(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1889 (2010).
189
See id. § 939F(d). Notably, DBRS points out that “[a]lthough Section 939F
is awkwardly constructed . . . the correct reading of the provision requires the
Commission to make the threshold public interest/protection of investors
determination before engaging in any new rulemaking on assigned credit ratings.”
Letter from Daniel Curry, President, & Mary Keogh, Managing Dir., Regulatory
Affairs, DBRS Ltd., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 2 (Sept. 13,
2011) [hereinafter DBRS Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/
4629-21.pdf. This means that the SEC need not adopt a system separating issuer
payment and selection to the extent it finds that it is not necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
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that an alternative system would be better.190 The resolution of
this item has the potential to bestow important new benefits
upon the NRSROs, but it also has the potential to impose
significant new burdens.
2. The Elimination of Most Regulatory Licenses
As part of Dodd-Frank, Congress eliminated
substantially all NRSRO-dependent regulatory licenses on the
federal level effective July 2012 by striking statutory
references to NRSRO credit ratings191 and causing each federal
agency to do the same with respect to their regulations.192 In
each case, the relevant federal agencies, such as the SEC, must
then replace such references or any “requirement of reliance on
credit ratings and . . . substitute in such regulations such
standard of credit-worthiness as each respective agency shall
determine as appropriate for such regulations.”193 A question
remains, however, whether such NRSRO-dependent regulatory
licenses will reemerge unscathed as part of the new standards
meant to replace them. Some market participants contend that
the requirement to replace such references or any requirement
of reliance on credit ratings plainly forbids the federal agencies
from incorporating any new form of reliance on NRSRO credit
ratings into their new standards of creditworthiness, much like
the SEC did with the first licensing rollback.194 Other market
participants, however, interpret the “determine as appropriate”
clause to mean that the federal agencies have discretion to
incorporate NRSRO ratings as part of the new standards of
creditworthiness so long as such incorporation is consistent
with Congress’s intent to reduce, as opposed to eliminate,
reliance on ratings.195
190

Dodd-Frank § 939.
See id.
192
See id. § 939A.
193
Id. § 939A(b) (emphasis added).
194
See, e.g., Letter from Dennis M. Kelleher, President & CEO, & Stephen W.
Hall, Sec. Specialist, Better Mkts., Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch.
Comm’n 7 (July 5, 2011) [hereinafter Better Markets Letter] (“The Dodd-Frank Act
requires the Commission and other agencies to remove references to credit ratings from
their regulations, and to substitute alternative standards of credit-worthiness as each
agency deems appropriate. Allowing broker-dealers to continue using credit ratings
when assessing credit risk would violate this statutory mandate.” (emphasis omitted)).
195
See, e.g., Letter from Suzanne Rothwell, Managing Member, Rothwell
Consulting LLC, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 7 (July 5, 2011)
(“It is unclear whether the ‘as appropriate’ language reflects the intention of Congress
that each agency retains some flexibility to continue to rely on credit rating standards
191
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In its proposed new standards of creditworthiness, the
SEC has taken the latter view by including partial reliance on
NRSRO credit ratings as part of a broader professional
judgment analysis.196 It appears, however, that such partial
reliance on NRSRO credit ratings would be permissive—not
mandatory—so investment fiduciaries would ultimately decide
whether such partial reliance would be appropriate in
satisfying their legal duties.197
Moreover, it appears that the SEC would not limit such
permissive reliance to NRSRO credit ratings.198 Thus,
fiduciaries could equally rely on non-NRSRO credit ratings to
the extent they deem appropriate and consistent with their
legal duties. Since reliance on credit ratings for these purposes
would no longer be limited to NRSROs, this would succeed in
eliminating substantially all NRSRO-dependent regulatory
licenses on the federal level. Many of the comment letters
received to date, especially with respect to the rules governing
money market funds, oppose this result and request that the
SEC find a way to preserve the NRSRO-dependent rules or
lobby Congress to amend Dodd-Frank to this end.199
Although NRSRO-specific regulatory licenses may be
substantially eliminated on the federal level in the near future,
they will not be defunct. A handful of NRSRO-dependent

in appropriate situations. As reflected in the statement in the Proposing Release,
Congress explained that Section 939A of Dodd-Frank is designed ‘[t]o reduce the
reliance on ratings.’ This explanation appears to indicate that the SEC is only required
to ‘reduce’ rather than ‘eliminate’ entirely all references to credit ratings.”).
196
See, e.g., SEC April 2011 Release, supra note 112, at 11 (“Under the
proposed amendments, a broker-dealer, when assessing credit risk, could consider the
following factors, to the extent appropriate, with respect to each security: . . . Internal
or external credit risk assessments (i.e., whether credit assessments developed
internally by the broker-dealer or externally by a credit rating agency, irrespective of
its status as an NRSRO, express a view as to the credit risk associated with a
particular security . . . .)”); see also References to Credit Ratings in Certain Investment
Company Act Rules and Forms, Securities Act Release No. 9193, Investment Company
Act Release No. 29,592, at 9 (Mar. 3, 2011) (“Fund boards of directors (which typically
rely on the fund’s adviser) would still be able to consider quality determinations
prepared by outside sources, including NRSRO ratings, that fund advisers conclude are
credible and reliable, in making credit risk determinations.”).
197
See sources cited supra note 195.
198
See sources cited supra note 195.
199
See, e.g., Letter from Timothy W. Cameron, Managing Dir., SIFMA’s Asset
Mgmt. Grp., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 2-3 (Apr. 18, 2011)
(arguing that ratings provisions should be retained in Rule 2a-7 and supporting efforts
to urge Congress to amend Section 939A of Dodd-Frank to retain the references to
ratings); see also Letter from C. David Messman, Sec’y & Chief Legal Officer, Wells
Fargo Funds Mgmt., LLC, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 1 (Apr.
25, 2011) (same).
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regulatory licenses will still remain on the federal level200 in
addition to state NRSRO-dependent regulatory licenses201 and
those in the contracts and other documents of private entities.
NRSROs will also continue to benefit from international
regulatory licenses though none would bear on the NRSRO
Nullification analysis.202 Thus, a fraction of the previous power to
license will continue to be a financial benefit for the NRSROs.
Given that the full scope of the regulatory licensing benefit
remains unresolved, it is impossible to speculate how the
NRSROs’ bottom lines may be affected in the future by this
impending change.
3. The Repeal of the Negligence Shield
As part of Dodd-Frank, Congress finally repealed the
NRSROs’ long-standing negligence shield under Section 11 for
ratings disclosed in a registration statement,203 but
perplexingly, Congress did not thereby expose the NRSROs to
negligence. This is because Congress did not repeal the
NRSROs’ existing right to refuse consent to negligence
exposure,204 nor did it require that any ratings had to be
disclosed (as the SEC considered at one point).205 As they had
threatened to do for some time, the NRSROs withheld their
200

See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 1426(c)(6) (West 2011) (depends upon at least one
major credit rating agency); id. § 1715z-22a(2)(A) (depends upon Standard and Poor’s
or any other nationally recognized rating agency); 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(5)(B) (2006)
(depends on NRSROs); id. § 1083 (builds term “investment grade” into the definition of
“corporate bond yield curve”); id. § 1306(E)(iv) (references “investment grade corporate
bonds”); 20 U.S.C. § 1087-2(d), (r) (2006) (depends on NRSROs); 23 U.S.C. § 601 (2006)
(depends on rating agencies defined as NRSROs).
201
The most significant regulatory licenses that survive Dodd-Frank on the
state level are those in insurance regulation. See John Patrick Hunt, Credit Ratings in
Insurance Regulation: The Missing Piece of Financial Reform, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1667, 1686 (2011) (“If the insurance regulators maintain rating-dependent regulation,
then Dodd-Frank’s purpose in eliminating credit ratings from federal financial regulation
will be substantially frustrated.”).
202
Since NRSRO status is a U.S. legal concept, foreign regulatory schemes
and treaties generally do not rely on NRSROs, but rather their own parallel construct.
For example, under the Basel III framework, the parallel to NRSROs are external
credit assessment institutions or “ECAIs.” See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: A GLOBAL
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 52
(2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. But see SEC REPORT OF 2003,
supra note 9, at 8 n.22 (“In El Salvador . . . a rating agency can register as a ‘classifier
of risk’ under the country’s securities laws if the rating agency is an NRSRO as
recognized by the SEC.” (citations omitted)).
203
See supra note 29.
204
See supra note 31.
205
See supra note 156.

1052

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:3

consent to allow issuers to disclose their ratings in future
registration statements in order to avoid such exposure.206 In
spite of some convincing rhetoric that Congress intended
negligence exposure through the repeal of the negligence
shield,207 the SEC issued temporary guidance assuring the
market that the NRSROs’ interpretation of their consent right
was correct and that previously required ratings disclosure
could henceforth be omitted.208
By removing this NRSRO-specific negligence shield,
Congress put the NRSROs and non-NRSROs on a level playing
field in this respect. As a result, registration statements have
generally not included ratings disclosure since the end of July
2010, although issuers have continued to include ratings
disclosure in other types of prospectuses.209 While the repeal of
the negligence shield opens up the possibility that CRAs may
seek to distinguish themselves from the pack by voluntarily
consenting to negligence exposure in the future, there is
currently no indication that any would be willing to do so. Since
the negligence shield no longer provides a benefit to the
NRSROs, however, it removes a distinction that previously
weighed against NRSRO Nullification.210 In addition, Ratings
206

See supra note 32.
See supra note 29.
208
See Ford No-Action Letter, supra note 32 (“[D]isclosure of a rating in a
registration statement requires inclusion of the consent by the rating agency to be
named as an expert. . . . Pending further notice, the Division will not recommend
enforcement action to the Commission if an asset-backed issuer as defined in Item
1101 of Regulation AB omits the ratings disclosure required by Item 1103(a)(9) and
1120 of Regulation AB from a prospectus that is part of a registration statement
relating to an offering of asset-backed securities.”).
209
Issuers can disclose credit ratings in free writing prospectuses because
such prospectuses do not become a part of the final registration statement and
therefore are not subject to Section 11 liability. Such free writing prospectuses can
include information, such as credit ratings, even though they are not included in the
registration statement. See Securities Act of 1933 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77j(b) (West
2011); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.408(b), 433 (2011). Typically, such free writing
prospectuses are term-sheets filed with the SEC at the time the issuers begin selling
their securities. See, e.g., Ford Credit Auto Lease Trust 2011-A, Free Writing
Prospectus (June 27, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1524342/000095012311062759/u50533f2fwp.htm (showing credit ratings by Moody’s
and Fitch). In addition to free writing prospectuses, permissive disclosure of NRSRO
credit ratings was also historically allowed in Rule 134 tombstone advertisements
without Section 11 liability. See Regulation S-K § 10(c), 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(c). The SEC
rescinded this rule in July 2011 effective September 2, 2011. See Security Ratings,
Securities Act Release No. 9245, at 6 (July 27, 2011) (“[W]e are removing Rule
134(a)(17) under the Securities Act.”).
210
There is currently a pending bill in Congress, however, seeking to restore
Rule 436(g) and thus reinstate the NRSRO-specific negligence shield. See Asset-Backed
Market Stabilization Act of 2011, H.R. 1539, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1539rh/pdf/BILLS-112hr1539rh.pdf.
207
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Reform introduced two other forms of heightened liability—
enhanced SEC penalty powers211 and exposure to private rights of
action under Section 18 of the Exchange Act212—that are also
NRSRO-specific.213
4. The Demise of the Seal of Approval
Dodd-Frank, unlike previous efforts, substantially
eliminated references to NRSRO credit ratings on the federal
level and, by repealing the negligence shield, eliminated such
references in registration statements. The elimination of federal
government reliance on NRSRO ratings, which has not yet
become effective, would appear to officially sever any perception
that NRSRO credit ratings are government-sponsored (at least
at the federal level). The elimination of credit ratings from
registration statements, moreover, has signaled to investors that
the federal government is no longer making it easy for investors
to find and rely on such ratings even though they are still
available on NRSRO websites and in nonregistration statement
prospectuses.214 Moreover, the fact that the NRSROs refused to
accept negligence exposure should raise a red flag for investors
since the NRSROs themselves do not have sufficient confidence
in their ratings to bear this exposure voluntarily.
While the demise of the government’s purported seal of
approval will significantly reduce the visibility of NRSRO
credit ratings in statutes, regulations, and registration
statements, there has been no shortage of visibility for the Big
Three from the media, especially in the realm of debt sold by

211

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(p)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(p)(4).
Nonetheless, the SEC has indicated that its existing powers under the Exchange Act to
“impose fines, penalties, and other sanctions on an NRSRO for violations of Section
15E of the Exchange Act and the rules thereunder” are already “sufficiently broad”
such that it is not imposing new fines at this time. See Proposed Rules for Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 64,514, at 53
(May 18, 2011) [hereinafter SEC May 2011 Release].
212
See supra note 175; see also Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (replacing various references to “furnishing” with references to
“filing.”). Filing, as opposed to furnishing, brings reports and other documents filed
with the SEC (e.g., Form NRSRO) within the purview of liability under Sections 18 of
the Exchange Act for false or misleading statements made in such reports or other
documents. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78r (West 2012).
213
Dodd-Frank also lowered the pleading standard in 10b-5 litigation against
all CRAs and added a due diligence defense, which will heighten the settlement value
and ability to win judgments against the CRAs in future actions and will promote
increased due diligence. See Dodd-Frank § 933.
214
See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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sovereign nations.215 Most significantly, S&P sought to make it
abundantly clear that it is at odds with the U.S. government by
taking the unprecedented step of downgrading the United
States’ triple-A credit rating to double-A in August 2011.216
Tremendous volatility in the stock markets followed. And while
Egan-Jones, one of the seven smaller NRSROs, beat S&P to the
punch weeks earlier, “[a]lmost no one paid attention.”217 This
shows yet again that, in spite of any perceived seal of approval
attributed to NRSRO status, the smaller NRSROs do not share
this benefit equally with the Big Three. The seal of approval
benefit may have always been illusory.
Congress’s message, moreover, was not solely that
investors and regulators should reduce reliance on ratings.
Through heightened regulation and the reintroduction of due
diligence, Congress also signaled that the watchdog is now back
on guard. This competing message may prove especially salient
if the Franken Proposal is adopted. Since QNRSROs would have
a new means of regulatory visibility and a new investorcontrolled CRA Board to signal the value of NRSRO ratings to
investors, this could provide an unprecedented form of visibility
and positive press for lesser established NRSROs. It could
thereby reverse the long-time reliance on national recognition as
a proxy for safety and quality and replace it with an objective
assessment of good performance. This might introduce a new
investor-sanctioned seal of approval that could provide
significant reputational benefits to the best performers.218

215

See, e.g., Stephen Fidler, Greek Debt Hits a New Low, WALL ST. J., June 14,
2011, at C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303848104576
383660422679124.html?KEYWORDS=Greece+rating (discussing S&P’s downgrade of
Greece to below investment grade); Patricia Kowsmann, Portugal’s Debt Agency Slams
Moody’s, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230
3544604576433401104276740.html?KEYWORDS=Greece+downgrade (discussing Moody’s
downgrade of Portugal to below investment grade); David Weidner, Rating the Ratings
Firms: An “I” for “Ignore”, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424053111903885604576486780718385072.html?KEYWORDS=weidner+rating
(discussing why the market should downgrade Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch by ignoring them).
216
See Damian Paletta & Matt Phillips, S&P Strips U.S. of Top Credit Rating,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2011, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001
424053111903366504576491421339802788.html?KEYWORDS=SP+downgrade.
217
See Neumann, supra note 142.
218
To make clear that there would be no government seal of approval, the
Franken Proposal proposes the following disclaimer: “This initial rating has not been
evaluated, approved, or certified by the Government of the United States or by a
Federal agency.” See Franken Proposal, supra note 95, § 15E(w)(6).
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5. Heightened NRSRO Regulation
In light of the new problems observed during the
financial crisis of 2008, Congress adopted a number of
heightened regulatory measures. These measures once again
increase NRSRO-specific burdens without adding any
offsetting benefits. Such heightened regulation includes new
and enhanced disclosure obligations,219 new and enhanced
recordkeeping rules,220 additional measures to combat conflicts
of interest,221 the establishment of an Office of Credit Ratings,222
corporate governance reforms,223 new qualification standards for
rating analysts,224 new whistle-blower duties,225 a duty to
consider information from sources other than the issuer when
making rating decisions,226 procedures to assess the probability
that an issuer will default, clear definitions of symbols used to
denote credit ratings, and consistent use of any such symbols.227
As a result of the expected high costs of compliance, some CRAs
that have been considering registration as NRSROs, such as

219

See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15E(q)-(s), 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 78o-7(q)-(s) (West 2011). In addition, the SEC has proposed (1) an enhanced Form
NRSRO including a new standard format Transition/Default Matrix that all NRSROs
would have to use to show performance data; (2) enhanced rating history disclosures
for each rating outstanding on or after June 26, 2007; and (3) a new Information
Disclosure Form to accompany each rating action, which will include the disclosure of
thirteen items that include the main assumptions used in constructing procedures and
methodologies, potential limitations of credit ratings, a description of the data relied on
for the purpose of determining such ratings, and the use of third party due diligence
services. See SEC May 2011 Release, supra note 211, at 56-88, 99-119, 459-63.
220
See SEC May 2011 Release, supra note 211, at 315-19 (discussing proposed
paragraphs (a)(9) and (b)(12)-(15) to be amended to Rule 17g-2, 17 C.F.R. 240.17g-2).
221
See, e.g., Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1376,
1874-76 (2010); SEC May 2011 Release, supra note 211, at 25-26, 37-45 (discussing
proposed paragraph (c)(8) to Rule 17g-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5 and proposed new Rule
17g-8(c), which would be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-8).
222
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15E(p)(1), (3), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78o7(p)(1), (3). The Office of Credit Ratings will monitor ratings determinations, promote
ratings accuracy, “ensure that such ratings are not unduly influenced by conflicts,” and
conduct an annual examination of each NRSRO. Id. As of September 30, 2011, this
office was not established due to the failure of the House and Senate Appropriations
Subcommittees on Financial Services and General Government to provide the
necessary approval. See SEC SEPT. 2011 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 47, at 8. The
proposed CRA Board under the Franken Proposal, by contrast, would likely not have
such funding problems since it would be permitted to levy fees periodically from the
QNRSROs and QNRSRO applicants. See Franken Proposal, supra note 95,
§ 15E(w)(2)(D).
223
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(t), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(t).
224
See Dodd-Frank § 936.
225
Id. § 934.
226
Id. § 935.
227
Id. § 938.
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Rapid Ratings,228 have so far refrained from doing so.229 A
current NRSRO, DBRS, suggestively points out that two
current NRSROs, JCR and R&I, have withdrawn their
registrations with respect to structured finance products and
have thus stopped rating such securities due to the new costs,
while another NRSRO, A.M. Best, has curtailed the expansion
of its rating activities as a result.230 Yet another NRSRO, Kroll,
advocates for the expansion of the Equal Access Rule, which
provides an NRSRO-specific benefit, to include all CRAs.231 This
suggests that Kroll may want the ability to take advantage of
this benefit without subjection to the legal burdens of the
regulatory regime. Along the same lines, Kroll has described
the new disclosure rules as a “disincentive to any credit rating
agency considering becoming an NRSRO.”232 Similarly, A.M.
Best and Egan-Jones have described the new disclosure rules
as “disproportionately hurt[ing]” and “counter-productive for”
the smaller NRSROs.233
In summation, NRSRO status has become much less
attractive than it used to be. Of the three main financial
benefits from earlier eras—lack of competition, regulatory
licensing power, and the negligence shield—only a fraction of
the regulatory licensing power remains and the Equal Access
Rule provides a benefit that no NRSROs have yet used. In
addition, a reputational benefit remains by virtue of the
message sent to the market that such NRSROs are regulated.
Nonetheless, the market continues to listen to the opinions of
the Big Three and mostly ignores the seven smallest NRSROs,
228

See History, RAPID RATINGS: FIN. HEALTH RATINGS, http://www.rapidratings.com/
page.php?25 (last visited Jan. 22, 2012) (“Rapid Ratings may or may not apply for [NRSRO]
designation, depending on how the SEC moves forwards on a variety of rule amendment
recommendations put forth in June 2008.”).
229
See Neumann, supra note 142 (Rapid Ratings “decided not to seek SEC
approval because of compliance and administrative costs. . . . DBRS [] said it is worried
that the costs of complying with tougher disclosures if the rules go through could
discourage upstarts from seeking SEC approval.”).
230
See DBRS Letter, supra note 189, at 8 nn.33-34.
231
See Letter from James Nadler, President of Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc.
on Release No. 34-64,456, File No. 4-629, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch.
Comm’n 8 (Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Kroll Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/4-629/4629-15.pdf.
232
See Letter from Jules B. Kroll, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Kroll Bond
Rating Agency, Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 11 (Aug. 8,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-11/s71811-36.pdf.
233
See Letter from Larry G. Mayewski, Exec. Vice President, A.M. Best Co., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 2 (Aug. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-11/s71811-39.pdf; Letter from Sean J. Egan, EganJones Ratings Co., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 1 (Aug. 5, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-11/s71811-27.pdf.
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showing that NRSRO status confers no meaningful seal of
approval. Finally, the legal burdens of NRSRO status have
substantially increased through heightened regulation. While
the tipping point towards NRSRO Nullification has not been
reached for any of the club’s current members, the evidence
suggests that today’s NRSROs are paying careful attention to
the benefit/burden calculation. Depending on the resolution of
today’s unresolved items, withdrawal from the club appears to
be a realistic possibility.
III.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF TODAY’S UNRESOLVED ITEMS

This part identifies and discusses the financial and
reputational implications that today’s most critical unresolved
items—the Franken Proposal and the new standards of
creditworthiness—will have on the NRSROs’ decision to
withdraw from Ratings Reform. It then assesses the impact that
today’s existing distinctions in concert with such unresolved
items will have on this decision and the legal implications of
NRSRO Nullification. This part also assesses the extent to
which such items and their alternatives will promote accurate
and reliable ratings. It concludes that certain proposals for
resolving these items would be more likely to tip the balance
toward NRSRO Nullification, while other proposals would be
more likely to prevent this result, and that the smaller seven are
more likely to opt out of Ratings Reform than the Big Three.
A.

Financial and Reputational Implications
1. The Franken Proposal and its Alternatives
a. The Franken Proposal

Mechanically, the Franken Proposal would require the
SEC to create a self-regulatory organization (which could also
be a public or private utility),234 known as the CRA Board,
whose directors would be controlled by—and therefore aligned
with—the investor community.235 The CRA Board would
234

See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939F(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1889 (2010).
See Franken Proposal, supra note 95, § 15E(w)(2)(C) (“The [CRA] Board
shall initially be composed of an odd number of members selected from the
industry . . . . [N]ot less than a majority shall be representatives of the investor
industry who do not represent issuers . . . not less than 1 member should be a
representative of the issuer industry . . . not less than 1 member should be a
235
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determine the QNRSRO club’s membership through an
application process whereby they would assess, among other
things, the institutional and technical capacity of each NRSRO
to issue the required ratings.236 Unlike the high barrier to entry
that prevented non-NRSROs from becoming NRSROs prior to
2006, the QNRSRO barrier is intended to impose an
exceedingly low threshold for entry.237 Its goal of divorcing
issuer selection from issuer payment would mitigate the issuerpays conflict and the ratings-shopping problem. The CRA
Board would seek to achieve this goal by matching QNRSROs
and issuers with respect to the initial rating for a structured
finance product that the issuer would presumably purchase in
advance.238 The match would be made through a random
assignment system, such as a lottery or rotation, and the CRA
Board would rate the best performers and then increase or
decrease a QNRSRO’s market share in such matches based on
accurate performance over time.239 At least once each year, the
CRA Board would assess the performance of the QNRSROs.240
Issuers would still be free to shop for and purchase second
ratings on the open market,241 and the Equal Access Rule would
continue to permit nonhired NRSROs to compete through
unsolicited ratings.
This proposal has been met with substantial criticism
from the majority of today’s NRSROs.242 In particular, there is a
concern that the CRA Board would be poorly suited to
determine which NRSROs should be in the QNRSRO club and
how assignments should be allocated among them. The smaller
NRSROs, for whom the proposal was purportedly developed,
are concerned that they will be shut out of the benefits by new
conflicts of interest that may favor the Big Three as well as
high costs and bias based on their lesser developed track
representative of the credit rating agency industry; and . . . not less than 1 member
should be an independent member.”).
236
See id. § 15E(w)(3).
237
See supra note 181.
238
See Franken Proposal, supra note 95, § 15E(w)(5).
239
See id. (“The [CRA] Board shall . . . evaluate a number of selection
methods, including a lottery or rotating assignment system . . . . In evaluating a
selection method . . . the Board shall consider . . . a mechanism which increases or
decreases assignments based on past performance.”).
240
See id. § 15E(w)(7) (“The [CRA] Board shall . . . evaluate the performance
of each [QNRSRO], . . . at a minimum, [once per year].”).
241
See id. § 15E(w)(9) (“Nothing in this section shall prohibit an issuer from
requesting or receiving additional credit ratings with respect to a debt security, if the
initial credit rating is provided in accordance with this section.”).
242
See supra note 187.
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records.243 Such a club could simply reentrench the Big Three.244
The Big Three are concerned that their dominance could be
eroded in a nonmeritorious way245 and that the CRA Board may
be plagued by investor biases.246
None, however, appears to take issue with the CRA
Board’s rating function—only its ability to use this function to
allocate ratings business. In fact, many of the NRSROs would
seem to support the rating function, because it would provide
investors with a new tool to decide which NRSROs to hold in
highest esteem.247
While some of these concerns may be overstated and could
be addressed in the final rule, the widespread concern over the
allocating function, especially from the smaller NRSROs, suggests
that this cure may be worse than the disease.
243

See, e.g., DBRS Letter, supra note 189, at 8, 14 (discussing CRA Board’s
conflicts and arguing that the cost of participating in the Franken Proposal’s system
would discourage all but the largest rating agencies from even trying); see Kroll Letter,
supra note 231, at 2 (“[W]e question how the Board will evaluate the performance of a
new NRSRO, such as [Kroll], in a way that enables it to obtain [rating] assignments
based on merit.”).
244
See Kroll Letter, supra note 231, at 2 (“May further entrench the largest
incumbents”); Coffee, supra note 1, at 258 (“If the Board were to prefer established
raters with a demonstrated history of rating accuracy, this would largely perpetuate
the existing oligopoly of the Big Three and might subject the Board to criticism for
failing to encourage greater competition.”).
245
See Letter from Patrick Milano, Exec. Vice President, Operations,
Standard & Poor’s Ratings Servs., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 3
(Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter S&P Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4629/4629-19.pdf (“The [Franken Proposal] would effectively treat ratings as a
commodity, presuming that all ratings on structured finance products . . . are of equal
quality and utility.”); see also Bai, supra note 50, at 50 n.9 (quoting Sen. Christopher
Dodd: “Not all the rating agencies are equal . . . . [T]here are different companies of
different sizes and needs, and to be choosing rating agencies based on arbitrary choice
without considering whether or not the rating agency can actually do the job is my
concern.” (citations omitted)). Others have expressed similar concerns. See Coffee,
supra note 1, at 258.
246
See S&P Letter, supra note 245 (“[T]hose ultimately responsible for
selecting NRSROs to perform work may have their own biases. . . .”).
247
See, e.g., DBRS Letter, supra note 189, at 2 (“These goals are better served
by measures that . . . give investors the tools they need to make informed choices about
which credit ratings to employ in making their investment decisions.”); Letter from
Michel Madelain, President & Chief Operating Officer, Moody’s Investors Serv., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 6 (Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter 2011
Moody’s Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/4629-23.pdf (“Because
investors demand credible (i.e. objective, predictive and relatively stable)
ratings, . . . issuers are motivated to seek ratings from CRAs that have the best
reputations among investors. . . .”); S&P Letter, supra note 245, at 11-12 (“By selecting
a capable, well-regarded rating agency with a reputation for independence and
objectivity, issuers can increase the marketability of their securities.”); Morningstar
Letter, supra note 186, at 4 (“A Section 15E(w) System that examines ratings accuracy
and timeliness in the future assignment of ratings will encourage competition among
NRSROs to provide the most accurate and timely ratings in order to ensure that they
will continue to secure additional business under the Section 15E(w) System.”).
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The first benefit of the Franken Proposal is that
QNRSROs would get a guaranteed percentage of the structured
finance market for initial ratings. This guaranteed market
share would prove invaluable to any CRA since structured
finance products have the proven potential to outpace every
other type of debt security and, due to their complexity, such
products command justifiably higher prices.248 On the other
hand, exclusion from the QNRSRO club could impose a
substantial burden.
The Franken Proposal does not explain how the CRA
Board would initially allocate the guaranteed portion of initial
ratings business nor how exclusion would be decided.249 In the
free market, as of year-end 2010, the eight NRSROs registered
with respect to structured finance products shared the market
as follows: S&P (38.98 percent), Moody’s (33.57 percent), Fitch
(21.34 percent), DBRS (3.34 percent), Morningstar (2.75
percent), A.M. Best (0.02 percent), Egan-Jones (0.00 percent),
Kroll (0.00 percent).250 While these figures show that the Big
Three commanded almost 94 percent of this market, such
dominance does not seem manifestly disproportionate when
taking into account the disproportionately large staffing that
the Big Three have compared with the smaller NRSROs. Were
we to treat the total staff members at these eight agencies
(3,855)251 as devoted to structured finance ratings only,252 a
proportionate initial allocation of assignments by the CRA
Board (assuming all eight were admitted as QNRSROs) vis-à-vis
staffing would require dividing each agency’s total staff devoted
248

See Enhancing Investor Protection, supra note 52, at 55 (“[R]ating
structured finance products generated much higher fees than rating similar amounts of
corporate bonds. For example, rating a $350 million mortgage pool could justify a fee of
$200,000 to $250,000, while rating a municipal bond of similar size justified only a fee
of $50,000.” (citations omitted)); see also Abu Dhabi Comm. Bank v. Morgan Stanley &
Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 167 (S.D.N.Y 2009) (“[T]he Rating Agencies each received fees
in excess of three times their normal fees for rating the Cheyne SIV . . . .”).
249
Eight of today’s ten NRSROs are registered with the SEC with respect to
structured finance products. See Solicitation of Comment, supra note 95, at 7. Yet only
a subset of this group might benefit from the guaranteed business afforded by the CRA
Board’s system to the extent such NRSROs are not selected to be QNRSROs. See supra
note 236 and accompanying text.
250
See SEC SEPT. 2011 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 47, at 6-7.
251
Id. at 8.
252
The actual number of credit analysts and supervisors devoted only to
structured finance is not available. Disclosure on Form NRSRO only requires the total
number of credit analysts and supervisors and does not distinguish among the five
ratings categories: financial institutions, insurance companies, corporate issuers, assetbacked securities (i.e., structured finance), and government securities. See id.; see also
Form NRSRO, supra note 168, Exhibit 8.
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to structured finance products by the total staff of all eight
agencies devoted to the same. This would produce the following
initial allocations: S&P (34.89 percent), Moody’s (31.23 percent),
Fitch (27.20 percent), DBRS (2.46 percent), Morningstar (0.62
percent), A.M. Best (3.11 percent), Egan-Jones (0.13 percent),
Kroll (0.34 percent). Accordingly, the Big Three’s market share,
which would equal approximately 93 percent, would not be
meaningfully diluted. Such an allocation, however, would give
more work to firms like A.M. Best, Egan-Jones, and Kroll, which
would help them establish track records for accuracy.
Since the Franken Proposal does not explain how the
CRA Board would initially allocate the guaranteed portion of
initial ratings nor how it would exclude NRSROs, today’s
NRSROs understandably have concerns. One potential solution
to this problem would be to equate QNRSROs with those
NRSROs that are registered to rate structured finance
products and require that initial allocations be made in
proportion to staffing resources. Form NRSRO could be
amended to require the disclosure of the credit analysts and
supervisors devoted to each rating category.253 The institutional
and technical capacity test could also be objectified to confirm
that it is only meant to weed out NRSROs that are patently
unqualified to rate structured finance products. While the
smaller NRSROs would likely favor these solutions, the Big
Three might actually prefer allowing CRA Board discretion since
it could provide a way for investor representatives to filter out
NRSROs that the market would not trust. In spite of the Big
Three’s poor performance during the financial crisis, the market
has continued to trust the Big Three, so there is practically no
danger that the Big Three would face exclusion from the
QNRSRO club.254 The exclusion of the smaller NRSROs would
impose severe financial and reputational burdens, since they
would get no market share in initial ratings, which would
translate into fewer jobs in the market for second ratings.
The Big Three may also object to allocations in
proportion to staffing. Even though this would not
meaningfully dilute their current market share, it would
encourage smaller NRSROs to hire more credit analysts and
supervisors in order to take a larger slice of the pie. This would
potentially erode the Big Three’s market share in a
253
254

Cf. supra note 252.
See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
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nonmeritorious way. Any initial allocation, however, would be
nonmeritorious since there is not yet an accepted way to
measure good performance. Merit-based track records for
accuracy will take time to develop.255
The second benefit of the Franken Proposal for those in
the QNRSRO club is that the best-performing QNRSROs would
be rewarded with bonus assignments on initial ratings. This
mechanism would directly reward accurate performance and
would permit any subset of the QNRSROs to dominate the field
by virtue of their merit.
While initial allocations based on proportionate staffing
would not be merit-based, the CRA Board’s ability to adjust
ratings business in favor of the best performers based on past
performance addresses the fundamental problem of non-meritbased allocations. This also addresses any concerns that
guaranteed business would remove the incentives of the
NRSROs to work hard and produce rigorous and competitive
ratings.256 Thus, merit-based allocations would become the new
norm over time, which would confer a significant benefit on the
best-performing QNRSROs. While it would also impose a
burden for the poorer performing QNRSROs, it would provide
the proper incentives for such QNRSROs to improve their
performance or be penalized.
There is legitimate concern, however, that such
allocations will be unfair due to conflicts of interests or plain
incompetence. To the extent the CRA Board has subjective
discretion to allocate ratings, commentators have pointed out
that at least two new conflicts of interest would be introduced:
bias in favor of QNRSROs willing to produce more conservative
investor-friendly ratings (whether or not justified) since the
CRA Board would be controlled by investors;257 and bias in favor
of the Big Three since the CRA Board will depend on fees from
the deepest pockets among the QNRSROs for its continued
existence.258 While the final rules could mitigate such new
255

See Letter from Senator Al Franken & Senator Roger F. Wicker, to
Honorable Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (Sept. 14, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/4629-28.pdf (“Of course, these track
records would take time to develop. But, over time, it would be possible to effectively
judge NRSROs on track records of accuracy.”).
256
See 2011 Moody’s Letter, supra note 247, at 8 (“[S]uch a system may create
incentives to conduct the least amount of work and innovation possible to remain in the
lottery or rotation system.”); see also S&P Letter, supra note 245, at 2.
257
See S&P Letter, supra note 245.
258
See DBRS Letter, supra note 189, at 8 (“[I]t is likely to cost at least $300400 million to operate the Board. Under the best of circumstances, this expense would
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conflicts by requiring the metrics for such allocations to be
publicly disclosed and based on objectively verifiable
performance data, the determination of such metrics is not
obvious. The CRA Board would undermine its legitimacy if it
appeared to be plagued by new conflicts of interest.
Many in the market are concerned, most saliently, that
the CRA Board would be unqualified to discern what accurate
performance means and thus could not develop any system to
reward or penalize QNRSROs based on past performance. For
example, the Investment Company Institute asked, “[W]hat
will be the criteria used for determining the ‘best performer’ for
purposes of assigning a rating agency to a new issue? Is an ‘A1’
rating more correct than an ‘A’ rating?”259 The Financial
Services Roundtable points out that there are no accepted
performance measures, and if investors’ preferences and the
CRA Board’s preferences deviate, investors would be stuck
with bonds rated by NRSROs they do not like.260 S&P altogether
“rejects the notion that credit ratings can be ‘accurate’ or
‘inaccurate.’”261 To the extent the CRA Board is not able to
produce a definition of accuracy that the market accepts, the
goal of empowering this board to make merit-based allocations
would be completely compromised.
At present, some efforts have been made to develop
methodologies for defining accuracy. Professor Lynn Bai has
provided one example of standards for discerning accurate
performance that may be instructive in measuring the
performance of the various NRSROs and Professor Coffee has
provided another suggestion.262 In addition, Moody’s has

have to be divided among only four or five rating agencies, and would be in addition to
the costs of complying with whatever extra layer of regulation Qualified NRSRO status
might entail. At the end of the day, the cost of participating in the Section 15E(w)
System would be so high that it would discourage all but the largest rating agencies
from even trying.” (footnote omitted)).
259
156 CONG. REC. S3965, 3979 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Christopher Dodd).
260
Letter from Richard M. Whiting, Exec. Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Fin. Servs.
Roundtable, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 15 (Sept. 13, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/4629-16.pdf.
261
See S&P Letter, supra note 245, at 11.
262
See Bai, supra note 50, at 103 (“The default ratio, ‘fallen angels’ ratio,
rating change ratio, and large rating change ratio are used to measure rating agencies’
performance.”); see also Senate Turmoil Hearings, supra note 49 (Professor Coffee has
suggested that “[t]he SEC should define what ‘default’ or ‘impaired’ means so as to
include delayed payments, then calculate these rates over five year cumulative periods,
and publish its results on its own website. This would enable consumers to engage in a
simple, one stop comparison. For smaller institutions (e.g., small pension funds, or
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identified two methods of measuring ratings accuracy: one
ordinal (meaning relative performance) known as Average
Position, and the other cardinal (meaning absolute
performance) such as the “investment-grade default rate and
the average rating of defaulters prior to default.”263 Bai
indicates that ratios measuring default, migration from
investment-grade to non-investment-grade, and stability are
universally accepted, but other metrics are used without a
consensus over their value.264 Morningstar has suggested that
calibrated qualifications “could eliminate any undue influence
or the necessity for the CRA Board to make any individual
decisions
with
regard
to
particular
securitization
transactions.”265 While such transparency may minimize
concerns over conflicts of interest, any system seeking to define
accuracy in a business based on future predictions will
necessarily come under careful scrutiny, especially by those
found to be poor performers. This would suggest that, before
there is a consensus in the market over how to measure
relative accuracy, any system including an allocating function
based on accuracy ratings would be premature.
The final benefit of the Franken Proposal is
reputational and indirectly financial. Unless the market has
widespread reason to disagree with the rating abilities of the
CRA Board, the best-performing QNRSROs would be in a
better position over time to compete in the market for second
ratings than excluded NRSROs and non-NRSROs by virtue of
the reputational capital they would develop from the CRA
Board’s rankings. By publicly rewarding accuracy and thereby
communicating to the market a view regarding the agencies
that would be most likely to produce accurate initial ratings,
such signals would provide a benchmark for accuracy against
which the accuracy of second ratings could be tested. This
would influence the preferences of investment fiduciaries in
relying on NRSROs, since it would provide insight regarding
the best performers that is currently hard to identify in the
market. These preferences, in turn, would influence the hiring
college endowments), the in-house financial staff is often thin and only a simplified
comparison will enable them to shop effectively.”).
263
2011 Moody’s Letter, supra note 247, at annex i. “Our principal measure of
ratings accuracy is the Average Position (AP) of defaulters. Bounded between 0 and 1,
AP measures where in the distribution of ratings defaulters were located relative to
non-defaulters.” Id.
264
See Bai, supra note 50, at 79-80.
265
Morningstar Letter, supra note 186, at 3.
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practices of issuers since interest rates on debt securities would
be affected in their negotiations with underwriters.
If investment fiduciaries believed in the accuracy of a
rating, then they would accept an interest rate commensurate
with the normal range for such rating. If, on the other hand,
they believed that a rating may be inflated, they would
justifiably demand a premium on the interest rate above the
normal range. For example, if an issuer were to hire the worstperforming QNRSRO (or, alternatively, an excluded NRSRO or
non-NRSRO) to give a second rating on its securities when it
could have hired one of the best-performing QNRSROs,
investment fiduciaries would demand a higher interest rate to
compensate them for the risk of inflated ratings. They would
communicate these preferences to underwriters prior to pricing
and such preferences would get incorporated into the pricing
negotiations. To avoid this dilemma, issuers would come to
prefer hiring the best-performing QNRSROs to give second
ratings since this would undermine any such argument about
the propriety of a ratings inflation risk premium.
In this way, the CRA Board’s rating function would
realign the financial and reputational interests of all QNRSROs
to favor accuracy. Since the CRA Board would send a signal of
credibility into the market, all QNRSROs would be encouraged
to produce the most accurate ratings possible to benefit from this
signal. Although the poor performers would experience a
reputational burden, this would only further incentivize them to
improve their performance. Investment fiduciaries, moreover,
would generally trust this message since it would come from an
investor-controlled board. Since only QNRSROs would be
evaluated, the market would encourage non-NRSROs and
excluded NRSROs to join the NRSRO and QNRSRO clubs to get
this reputational benefit. Opting out of either status, by
contrast, would mean sacrificing such reputational benefit. So
the rating function would work to keep NRSROs voluntarily
regulated (since only NRSROs can be QNRSROs) while at the
same time promoting accurate and reliable ratings.
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b. Alternatives to the Franken Proposal
As required by Congress, the SEC is also considering
five alternative proposals to the Franken Proposal to create
incentives for NRSROs to compete over accuracy.266
i. Rely Only on the Existing Equal Access Rule
The first alternative is to rely only on the existing Equal
Access Rule implemented in November 2009.267 This rule
created a mechanism for non-hired NRSROs in the structured
finance context to gain equal access to the information that
issuers provide to the NRSROs they hire so that such non-hired
NRSROs can provide unsolicited second ratings.268
While this rule allows non-hired NRSROs to compete in
the market for second ratings, and thereby ostensibly helps the
lesser known NRSROs develop track records for accuracy, it
does not provide a financial patron for such activities.269 Thus,
there is no guarantee that any NRSRO will find it financially
rational to take advantage of the Equal Access Rule. Indeed, it
appears that no NRSRO has taken advantage of the rule to
date.270 Moreover, they would not be encouraged to do so, since
this regime would not reward accuracy. Issuers would continue
to provide the primary source of revenue for ratings under this
system and NRSROs would be encouraged to please such
issuers even in the unsolicited context so that they could
potentially gain business from them in the future. Unless this
rule were coupled with a rating mechanism, such as that
provided by the Franken Proposal, it would only perpetuate
today’s race to the bottom, since issuers would still prefer to
hire NRSROs willing to inflate their ratings, and most
investment fiduciaries would not have the ability to forcefully
challenge such preferences.
Moreover, the enhancements proposed by the various
supporters of this proposal generally do not attempt to solve
the problem that non-hired NRSROs cannot afford to give
266

See supra note 95.
See supra note 144.
268
See supra note 144.
269
See Morningstar Letter, supra note 186, at 6 (“We believe that the absence
of unsolicited initial ratings primarily results from the costs of providing these
unsolicited ratings without adequate compensation and a lack of interest by arrangers
and investors in these ratings.”).
270
Id.
267
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unsolicited ratings for free,271 nor do they propose how market
actors should distinguish the best-performing NRSROs from
the worst, which is a task “far beyond the means of many
insurance companies, pension plans, and other small
institutional investors.”272 The proposed enhancements are
generally focused on two points: relaxing a rule that non-hired
NRSROs must rate one out of every ten deals they review273 and
allowing the disclosed information, which is currently available
only to NRSROs, to be made available to all market
participants (most pertinently, non-NRSROs).274
Reliance only on the Equal Access Rule is effectively a
do-nothing approach that does not offer new financial benefits
to the NRSROs nor a mechanism to promote accurate and
reliable ratings. Moreover, it imposes a financial burden as a
condition for competing since lesser established NRSROs would
need to find separate funding to provide such ratings. One way
to indirectly get separate funding would be to leave the
regulatory regime and put such costs savings into unsolicited
ratings instead. This might be the thinly veiled motivation
behind the suggestion from some NRSROs that equal access
should be expanded to non-NRSROs. Thus, adopting this
proposal may encourage NRSRO Nullification. This proposal,
subject to the suggested enhancements described above, is

271

Morningstar appears to be the only exception: it proposes applying the
Franken Proposal’s framework to the Equal Access Rule such that “NRSROs could be
selected on a rotational basis to provide an unsolicited rating. . . . [and] NRSROs could
be compensated on a market-value basis that could represent the average
compensation paid by the issuer to the Commission or other organization to the other
credit rating agencies rating the same transaction.” See id. at 7.
272
James Lardner, The Ratings Agencies and The Franken Amendment,
DEMOS (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.demos.org/publication/rating-agencies-and-frankenamendment-key-questions-and-answers-0.
273
17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(e) (2011). See Kroll Letter, supra note 231, at 3
(suggesting eliminating requirement that one in ten deals reviewed must be rated);
Letter from Karrie McMillan, Gen. Counsel, Investment Co. Inst., to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 6-7 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/4-629/4629-22.pdf (suggesting increasing the number of free peeks from ten
to twenty-five since a new entrant might find, for example, that it is not qualified to
review the first twelve issuances it reviews); Letter from Richard A. Dorfman,
Managing Dir., Head of Securitization, & Christopher B. Killian, Vice President,
Securitization Grp., Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n (SIFMA), to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 23 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/4-629/4629-9.pdf (suggesting that only one in twenty deals reviewed be
required to be rated).
274
See Kroll Letter, supra note 231, at 3 (suggesting equal access should be
expanded to all market participants, not just NRSROs); 2011 Moody’s Letter, supra
note 247, at 2 (same).
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supported by Moody’s, S&P, Fitch, and Kroll as well as a
number of other non-CRA entities.275
ii. Create an Investor-Owned NRSRO
The second alternative is to create an investor-owned
NRSRO that would compete with the existing NRSROs. By
law, issuers would have to obtain initial credit ratings from the
investor-owned NRSRO and a second issuer-chosen rating from
one of the existing NRSROs. While this solution divorces issuer
selection from issuer payment in the initial credit rating
context by presumably forcing the issuer to pay for a rating
from the investor-owned NRSRO, it does not do so with respect
to second ratings. Thus, a monopoly would be created for the
investor-owned NRSRO in the market for initial ratings while
a fierce competition would be set into motion in the market for
second ratings.
Since the market for initial ratings would be
monopolized, today’s NRSROs would be denied their current
market share of initial ratings representing the loss of an
important financial benefit. Since this model has no
mechanism to reward accuracy, the market for second ratings
would be plagued by the same race to the bottom that currently
exists for all ratings. Issuers (and perhaps investors),
moreover, would likely distrust the ratings from the investorowned NRSRO for a number of reasons: it may have investor
biases since investors own it, it may lack incentives to do high
quality work since it would have a monopoly, and it would lack
an established track record as a newcomer. As a result, such
ratings would not provide a reliable benchmark for accuracy
against which the accuracy of second ratings could be tested.
So this model would remove an important financial benefit
from today’s NRSROs (the ability to compete for a share of the
initial credit ratings market), and like the first alternative
approach, it would not address the conflicts of interest at the
heart of the rating-agency question. In the comment letters
sent to the SEC, no commentators supported this proposal.276

275
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See Comments on Solicitation, supra note 187.
See id.
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iii. Split the Bill Among Participants
The third alternative does not clarify whether it would
permit the issuer to select its preferred NRSRO for initial credit
ratings. It only focuses on fees by stating,
an NRSRO would be compensated through transaction fees imposed
on original issuance and on secondary market transactions. Part of
the fee would be paid by the issuer or secondary-market seller and
the other portion of the fee by the investors purchasing the security
in either the primary or secondary markets.277

It appears that this model intends to split the bill
among the issuer, investors, and secondary-market sellers,
which would presumably mitigate some of the loyalty that the
NRSROs feel toward the issuer as their sole client. While this
would partially divorce issuer selection from issuer payment, it
would not satisfy Congress’s requirement that the issuer and
issuer-aligned parties may not select the NRSRO that will
determine and monitor initial credit ratings.278
Moreover, although this proposal partially mitigates the
issuer-pays conflict, it does not address the ratings-shopping
problem if the issuer would ultimately decide which NRSRO to
choose. Thus, there would still be a race to the bottom since
this model proposes no mechanism to reward accuracy. As a
result, the misaligned incentives and today’s status quo would
persist. This model proposes no other benefits to the NRSROs.
In the comment letters sent to the SEC, no commentators
supported this proposal.279
iv. Institute a User-Pays Model
The fourth alternative involves the institution of a userpays model. Under this model, the issuer would not pay for any
ratings and the full fee would be allocated to users, defined as
“any entity that included a rated security, loan, or contract as an
element of its assets or liabilities as recorded in an audited
financial statement.”280 Such users would be required to enter
into a contract with an NRSRO and pay for its rating services.281

277
278
279
280
281

See Solicitation of Comment, supra note 95, at 44.
See supra note 189.
See Comments on Solicitation, supra note 187.
See Solicitation of Comment, supra note 95, at 46.
See id.
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While forcing investors to buy NRSRO ratings would
guarantee business to the NRSROs by effectively reinstituting
a new form of NRSRO-dependent regulatory license, the failure
of a mechanism to reward accuracy would mean that this
model would suffer from today’s conflicts of interest in reverse.
Although it eliminates the issuer-pays conflict, it introduces in
its place a user-pays conflict and merely reverses the ratingsshopping problem. Under this model, some users would shop to
select the NRSROs most willing to deflate (rather than inflate)
ratings at the lowest prices.282 While this might benefit
investors in the short term by driving up interest rates on
relatively safe securities, this type of artificial ratings deflation
could significantly raise the cost of capital for issuers, which
could have unforeseen macroeconomic consequences in much
the same way that artificial ratings inflation did during the
financial crisis of 2008. Since this model would only offer new
financial benefits to those NRSROs most willing to please
investors rather than those most able to produce accurate
ratings, it would simply flip today’s problems instead of
address them. In the comment letters sent to the SEC, no
commentators supported this proposal, although one
commentator provided a detailed alternative user-fee system.283
v. Institute an Investor Designation Model
The fifth alternative would be an investor designation
model. Under this model, the security holders would select the
NRSRO or NRSROs that would get paid and the amount of
payment while the issuer would pay the NRSRO or NRSROs
according to such directions. This would successfully divorce
issuer selection from issuer payment in the market for initial
ratings in keeping with Congress’s mandate. Instead of the
Franken Proposal’s CRA Board making rating assignments in
advance to a specific NRSRO, however, the NRSROs would
choose to do the work before knowing whether they would be
compensated and, if so, how much. After the work is done, the
security holders would make the compensation decision “based
on their perception of [the] research underlying the ratings.”284
282

See PARTNOY, supra note 62, at 12 (Some institutions “might press the
rating agencies for lower ratings in hopes of receiving higher returns.”).
283
Letter from Jeffrey Manns, Assoc. Professor, George Washington Univ.
Law Sch. (Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/4629-25.pdf.
284
See Solicitation of Comment, supra note 95, at 45.
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They would vote in proportion to their holdings and the
payment would be made according to such instructions from a
deposit (presumably equal to the cost of one rating) that the
issuer would have placed in advance with a third party
administrator as opposed to the CRA Board under the Franken
Proposal. There does not appear to be any requirement that the
security holders would have to consider long-term performance
data in allocating such payment.
This model would not only fail to reward accuracy, but
would also perpetuate the same financial burden that plagues
the Equal Access Rule: the prospect of uncompensated work.
Not only would there be no guaranteed minimal level of
business, but the NRSROs would be asked to spend time and
resources to produce ratings without any guarantee of payment
in whole or in part. Moreover, as with the user-pays model, this
model reverses the ratings-shopping problem by putting the
payment decision into the hands of interested security holders,
even though the payment source would be the issuer. Since
such security holders would not have to consider the long-term
accuracy of each NRSRO’s rating performance when deciding
which NRSROs to pay, they would be encouraged to pay the
NRSROs that have given the most deflated ratings in such
offering since that would translate into higher interest rates
benefiting the security holders in the short term. The familiar
race to the bottom would persist, financial benefits would only
accrue to those NRSROs able to win the affection of the most
security holders and one new financial burden (uncompensated
work) would be imposed. In the comment letters sent to the
SEC, no commentators supported this proposal.285
In summary, none of the alternatives to the Franken
Proposal that the SEC is currently considering would offer
NRSRO-specific benefits that are comparable to those offered
by the Franken Proposal: none would guarantee today’s
NRSROs any particular level of business, reward accurate
performance through bonus business or provide an investorcontrolled signal of credibility. Nonetheless, most NRSROs are
concerned that the allocating function would do more harm
than good, though all would appear to support the rating
function. While the Equal Access Rule has broader support
than the Franken Proposal, such support lacks a strong
foundation since this rule, like the other alternatives proposed,
285

See Comments on Solicitation, supra note 187.
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would not promote accurate and reliable ratings or work to
prevent NRSRO Nullification without being paired with a
rating feature. While it cannot be known if the adoption of any
of these alternatives in place of the Franken Proposal would
cause a tipping point towards NRSRO Nullification, all would
fall short of the Franken Proposal in preventing it.
2. The New Standards of Creditworthiness
Since the SEC’s proposals for the new standards of
creditworthiness do not require, but only permit, reliance on
NRSRO credit ratings as part of a broader professional
judgment analysis, the SEC’s proposed new standards would
succeed in eliminating the NRSROs’ power to license under the
federal securities laws since the NRSROs would no longer have
a mandate to determine creditworthiness. Instead, their
ratings would become one factor, if a factor at all, in an
investment fiduciary’s separate credit determination. This
would effectively shift the responsibility for such credit
determinations from the NRSROs (to the extent they were
previously responsible) to the appropriate investment fiduciary
in each case. Although some market participants have argued
that the federal agencies would be defying Congress’s intent by
incorporating any new form of reliance on NRSRO credit
ratings, voluntary reliance by fiduciaries is not prohibited.
Congress’s mandate would only prevent the SEC from
incorporating a “requirement of reliance.”286 Since requiring
reliance would violate Congress’s intent by effectively
reinstating regulatory licenses through the back door, I analyze
the federal agencies’ three other options with respect to the
incorporation of NRSRO credit ratings into the new standards
of creditworthiness: prohibiting reliance on NRSRO credit
ratings, permitting reliance on only NRSRO credit ratings, and
permitting reliance on any credit ratings.
The first option, advocated by some, would be to prohibit
reliance on NRSRO credit ratings altogether under the new
standards of creditworthiness.287 While the federal agencies
could hypothetically prohibit such reliance, they would need to
have an adequate substitute to replace credit ratings. While
the Free Market Camp has put forward some creative
possibilities, such as thirty-to-ninety day rolling averages of
286
287

Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939A(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1887 (2010).
See Better Markets Letter, supra note 194, at 7.
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credit spreads and credit-default-swap spreads,288 a chorus of
commentators appears to agree that such market measures
would not be a sufficient replacement.289 This likely explains the
shift in the Free Market Camp to a professional judgment
analysis that would include permissive partial reliance on both
market measures and credit ratings.290
The second option would be to permit voluntary reliance
on only NRSRO credit ratings as part of a professional
judgment analysis. This would raise the question of whether
such reliance should be limited to NRSRO credit ratings or
should apply equally to all credit ratings. If such reliance were
limited to NRSRO credit ratings only, this would provide a
significant benefit for the NRSROs, because investment
fiduciaries seeking to rely in part on credit ratings would be
limited to only the NRSRO pool. On the downside, however,
such a policy would discourage upstart CRAs that might have
the potential to outperform today’s NRSROs. In effect, it would
reinstate the chicken-and-egg problem that characterized the
NRSRO designation process prior to 2006.291 In addition, this
solution might unduly limit the ability of fiduciaries to fulfill
their legal duties in accordance with their own professional
judgment. On the one hand, investment fiduciaries would be
told to take ultimate responsibility for their investment
decisions; on the other hand, to the extent they rely on ratings,
they would be told to only rely on NRSRO ratings. This would
seem inconsistent with the new law’s approach of heightening
the investment fiduciary’s responsibility. While this solution
would work to prevent NRSRO Nullification, it would not be in
sync with the alternative answer to the rating-agency question:
professional judgment.
The third option would permit voluntary reliance on any
credit rating as part of a professional judgment analysis. This
would achieve the law’s purpose of placing greater
responsibility on the professional judgment of investment
fiduciaries and less on NRSROs. By not limiting fiduciaries to
288

See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Hill, supra note 17, at 143-44 (“Something else is to replace these
references. . . . The problem is that there is no ready alternative.”); see also Coffee,
supra note 1, at 233 (“Alternatives to credit ratings, such as credit default swap
spreads, provide at best only a partial substitute.”); SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9,
at 39 (“[T]he volatility of credit spreads, their backward-looking nature, and the fact
that their use would be limited to liquid securities, make them an inferior alternative
to credit ratings.”).
290
See Partnoy, supra note 67, at 16.
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See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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only NRSRO ratings, such fiduciaries would be free to ignore
credit ratings altogether or rely in part on either NRSRO or
non-NRSRO ratings as part of their professional judgment
analysis. Since no adequate substitute for ratings appears to
exist, most would likely opt to rely in part on the ratings that
would help produce the highest return and best support for
such fiduciary’s legal duties.
This comports with the SEC’s general proposal, which is to
permit fiduciaries to rely in part on any credit ratings, whether or
not they are NRSRO credit ratings.292 This levels the playing field
for NRSROs and non-NRSROs by allowing both to compete to
produce credit ratings that fiduciaries would want to incorporate
into their analyses. This would solve the chicken-and-egg problem
and would be in sync with the new law’s approach of heightening
the investment fiduciary’s responsibility.
Such an approach, however, has two potential
downsides: it might encourage NRSRO Nullification and could
lead to certain moral hazards. The former could be a potential
problem because this approach would not distinguish between
NRSROs and non-NRSROs. To the extent a CRA’s ratings
would be equally in demand as an NRSRO or non-NRSRO,
there would be no reason to stay regulated. So any solution
must counter this incentive. The latter could be a problem since
it presents the potential moral hazard that investment
fiduciaries may choose to “cover themselves” by relying blindly
or purposefully on poor performing NRSROs or non-NRSROs to
maximize returns. For example, if a fiduciary, such as a money
market fund manager, is required to invest in only safe
securities (i.e., highly rated securities), such a fiduciary, in
breach of his duties, might buy securities with higher yields
that it believes or should believe are riskier so long as they have
the desired safety rating given by some CRA.293 In good times, if
such securities do not default, a fund manager would appear to
be outperforming his competitors. In bad times, however, such a
fund manager might experience large losses and seek to deflect
blame under the cover of a “diligent analysis” and partial
reliance on credit ratings commensurate with safety. While a
professional judgment test is supposed to prevent excessive risk
taking by requiring reliance on other factors in addition to credit
292

See supra note 196.
See Coffee, supra note 1, at 259 (“[T]here is the even more sinister danger
that many institutions (in particular, money market funds) wanted inflated ratings so
that they could earn the higher returns from riskier securities.”).
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ratings, it is not supposed to end risk taking altogether. Proving
a breach of fiduciary duty under these circumstances would be
very hard since the principals would have no way of checking
the professional judgment analysis of their fiduciaries and
courts would not want to second-guess private decision making
fraught with inherent risks.294
Interestingly, the rating function from the Franken
Proposal could provide a potential solution to both NRSRO
Nullification and the moral hazard problems described above.
To the extent that the rater only evaluated the disclosed
performance statistics of NRSROs (and not non-NRSROs) to
tell fiduciaries and ultimate investors which NRSROs are the
best performers, this would work against NRSRO Nullification
by causing such fiduciaries to prefer NRSRO over non-NRSRO
ratings since the accuracy of the former would be better known
to the market. To the extent non-NRSROs would not be rated,
they would not benefit from the rater’s reputational signal.
This would work to negate NRSRO Nullification and encourage
NRSRO registration since any perceived incentive to leave the
regulatory regime would be undermined by the reputational
benefit a CRA could get through a rating.
Such a rater could also mitigate the moral hazard of
investment fiduciaries choosing to rely on poor performing
NRSROs and non-NRSROs to maximize their returns. Since
the rater would be opining about which NRSROs are the best
performers, investment fiduciaries choosing to ignore such
opinions may strike up suspicion among their ultimate
investors. Certifying agreement with the rater’s methodology
for defining accuracy and acting in accordance with such
opinions, by contrast, would send the opposite message to
investors. However, an investment fiduciary eager to show it is
not blindly relying on either credit ratings or the rater may
294

Traditionally the business judgment rule has protected the investment
decisions of fiduciaries relying on investment grade ratings, though this reliance
defense may be weakened now. See id. at 266 (“Today, if a money market fund’s board
suffers a major loss on an investment, it will very likely be protected by the business
judgment rule (and not be held liable) if an NRSRO ratings agency gave the flawed
security an investment grade rating.”). But see PARTNOY, supra note 62, at 6 (“The
accountability of NRSROs has deteriorated so much that institutional investors now
are vulnerable if they rely on credit ratings in making investment decisions. To the
extent rating agencies are not subject to liability, an institutional investor’s defense of
reliance on ratings is weakened, because constituents can argue that ratings are less
reliable when rating agencies are not accountable for fraudulent or reckless ratings.”).
Nonetheless, so long as they have done some private due diligence in addition to
relying on credit ratings and have a rational basis for their decision, proving a breach
of the duties of care or loyalty would likely be hard to do.
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have good reason to ignore such signal. In the case of
disagreement with the rater’s methodology, the SEC could
require that investment fiduciaries explain their reasons for
relying on ratings from non-NRSROs and ratings from those
NRSROs that the rater considers to be poor performers. This
would create a market-based countermechanism to check the
methodology of the rater and would work against blind reliance
on the opinions of such a rater. A requirement that agreement
with such methodology must be certified would similarly work
against blind reliance. By combining freedom to rely on any
ratings with a requirement that agreement with the rater’s
methodology for determining accuracy be certified and
disagreements with the rater’s methodology or reliance on nonNRSROs be explained, the law’s purpose of heightening the
investment fiduciaries’ responsibility would be achieved. It
would also mitigate the potential moral hazard because
investment fiduciaries would have to justify their reliance on
either the rater’s pronouncements or their own dissenting
conclusions in order to satisfy their legal duties.
In sum, while the SEC’s proposals for the content of the
new standards of creditworthiness would substantially eliminate
an important NRSRO-specific financial benefit on the federal
level (NRSRO-dependent regulatory licenses), permissible
reliance on such ratings as part of a broader professional
judgment analysis preserves the opportunity for NRSROs to still
capture much of this benefit, even if investment fiduciaries can
equally rely on non-NRSRO ratings. Moreover, there appear to
be ways to heighten the responsibility of investment fiduciaries
without encouraging NRSRO Nullification or otherwise
encouraging fiduciaries to take excessive risks that would be
contrary to the interests of their principals.
3. Existing Distinctions
At present, there is a sufficient equilibrium between the
benefits and burdens of NRSRO status that has kept today’s
NRSROs from surrendering their NRSRO status, even though
some non-NRSROs have chosen not to join the club as a result
of the current balance. In assessing whether the impact of
today’s most critical unresolved items will cause a tipping point
toward NRSRO Nullification, the existing benefits and burdens
of NRSRO status must be taken into account. The two primary
NRSRO-specific benefits that remain are reputational, and
financial benefits by virtue of the message an NRSRO sends to
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the market in being regulated and the persistence of NRSROspecific regulatory licenses. The Equal Access Rule also
provides an informational benefit to NRSROs. In addition, two
primary NRSRO-specific burdens also remain in the form of
the costs of being regulated and heightened liability exposure
as a result of the SEC’s enhanced penalty powers and exposure
to private rights of action. While these benefits and burdens
appear to sufficiently cancel each other out at the present, they
could become increasingly important in concert with the
resolution of today’s most critical unresolved items.
First, all ten NRSROs derive an intangible reputational
benefit from the message that regulation sends to the market.
This benefit, however, would be more valuable to the Big Three
than the other seven NRSROs because Ratings Reform was put
into place on account of the Big Three’s past performance.
Moreover, the Big Three, unlike the other seven, have been
subject to widespread negative media attention as a result of
their role as major culprits in the lead-up to the financial crisis
of 2008. Ratings Reform therefore signals the return of the
watchdog, which has likely restored a good deal of investor
confidence in the Big Three. Therefore, were any of the Big
Three to leave the regulatory regime, this would produce
headline news that might lead to a public outcry. Since such an
outcry could severely damage or destroy the Big Three’s
reputations, it would be unlikely that they would risk NRSRO
Nullification even if the costs of remaining regulated were
high. Thus, for the Big Three, the reputational benefits of
regulation weigh heavily against NRSRO Nullification.
By contrast, Ratings Reform was not put into place for
the other seven, nor have they received much criticism or
media attention. If any of the other seven opted out of Ratings
Reform, the public would be unlikely to react strongly, if at all.
The public may not appreciate the important role that the
other seven play in mitigating the importance of the Big Three.
As a result, the reputational benefits of remaining regulated
would weigh considerably less in any calculation favoring
NRSRO Nullification by the other seven NRSROs than it would
for the Big Three.
Second, all ten NRSROs have the opportunity to derive
financial benefits from all pre-Dodd-Frank regulatory licenses
through July 2012 and such remaining regulatory licenses
(which are mostly on the state and private levels) thereafter.
This benefit too, however, is more valuable to the Big Three
than the other seven. In spite of the Big Three’s poor
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performance during the recent financial crisis, “sticky”295
market practices suggest that the Big Three will continue to be
the primary beneficiaries of such regulatory licenses unless a
rater is put in place to send clear signals that better performers
should be hired instead. In the absence of a rater or the
Franken Proposal’s CRA Board, there would be few new
opportunities for the smaller seven to gain market share. To
the extent the smaller seven could do comparably good
business outside of the regulatory regime, the existence of some
fraction of today’s NRSRO-specific regulatory licenses may not
stop them from opting out.
Third, all ten NRSROs have the opportunity to benefit
from the Equal Access Rule. This rule, however, is meant to
favor the smaller seven over the Big Three. Since it provides
equal information to non-hired NRSROs, it is supposed to level
the playing field for the smaller seven since they are hired less
frequently than the Big Three. In reality, it has only provided a
marginal benefit, if any benefit, since taking advantage of the
rule has not been cost effective.296
Fourth, all ten NRSROs must pay the cost of complying
with Dodd-Frank’s heightened regulatory regime, whereas nonNRSROs are exempt from these costs. This burden also applies
differently to the Big Three and other seven NRSROs since the
Big Three, as bigger companies, have larger economies of scale
to afford such expenses. For the smaller NRSROs, such costs
are therefore relatively higher. As a result, NRSRO
Nullification would be more attractive in respect of the
compliance cost savings for the smaller seven NRSROs than for
the Big Three. So this factor, too, would more readily drive the
other seven to NRSRO Nullification than any of the Big Three.
On balance, the current equilibrium suggests that the
seven smaller NRSROs are in a more fragile position than the
Big Three with respect to NRSRO Nullification. While many of
these seven have fought hard for many years to gain NRSRO
status, it was more valuable in the past than it is now.
Although a sufficient equilibrium currently exists to keep such
NRSROs regulated, the resolution of the most critical
unresolved items could tip today’s balance, especially with
respect to the seven smallest NRSROs, if the burdens continue
to increase and the benefits continue to decrease.
295
296
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Legal Implications

In addition to the financial and reputational
implications discussed above, the NRSROs would not withdraw
from the regulatory regime unless it made legal sense. There
are two potential legal implications of NRSRO Nullification
that may work to deter its exercise: forced registration and
regulation under the Advisers Act, and new legislation to force
registration and regulation under Ratings Reform.
To the extent that any subset of the NRSROs left the
Ratings Reform regime, the SEC could force registration and
regulation under the Advisers Act without requiring new
legislation. This, however, would be undesirable. First, prior to
CRARA, the SEC and the case law both took the position that
CRAs were not required to be registered as investment
advisers.297 Second, while CRARA only granted an exemption
from the Advisers Act to NRSROs, the SEC has not mandated
that any non-NRSROs register under the Advisers Act.298 Third,
the Advisers Act was almost completely ineffective in terms of
regulating the NRSROs prior to CRARA.299 Thus, even though
withdrawal from NRSRO status might open the door to
capturing such newly minted non-NRSROs under the term
“investment adviser,”300 doing so would not replicate the
intended benefits to society of Ratings Reform—accurate and
reliable ratings—and therefore would not be desirable.
A second possibility is forced registration and regulation
under Ratings Reform. While this would require new legislation,
it would be a more desirable option than Advisors Act
regulation. Congress could supplement the NRSROs’ voluntary
withdrawal right and the CRAs’ voluntary registration right by
adopting a mandatory NRSRO registration requirement based
on external criteria. Such a requirement could force the CRAs
meeting specified criteria to register (or stay registered) and
thereby capture such agencies within the web of Ratings
Reform. This would mean that NRSROs would not only have to
297

See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
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accept the financial, reputational and legal burdens that exist
today, but they might also be prevented from avoiding new
burdens adopted in the future. This could serve to reverse or
prevent NRSRO Nullification.
But how far can the government reach in forcing
regulation upon CRAs that are non-NRSROs? Under
Congress’s commerce power, it can regulate “the use of the
channels of interstate commerce . . . the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, . . . [and] those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce.”301 Thus, Congress could not
reach (nor would it want to reach) all of the approximately
seventy-six global non-NRSROs, since most are foreign entities
that operate primarily outside of the jurisdiction of the United
States.302 For those non-NRSROs that rate debt securities
traded within the United States, however, Congress would
likely have wide latitude in imposing Ratings Reform if it chose
to do so, especially since there would be no First Amendment
concerns.303 Whether or not ratings themselves propose
commercial transactions,304 they become indelibly linked with
commercial transactions (the sale of debt securities) that form
a part of the core of American capitalism. Especially in light of
the role of credit ratings in the financial crisis of 2008, it is
likely beyond debate that credit ratings substantially affect
interstate commerce. Moreover, Congress has explicitly found
that “the activities of credit ratings agencies are fundamentally
commercial in character.”305 While the courts do not always
afford deference to Congress’s findings with respect to

301
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commerce,306 any CRA that rates debt securities traded within
the United States would be fighting an uphill battle to
challenge prospective legislation on the basis that its ratings
are noneconomic activity (i.e., merely speech) that do not
substantially affect interstate commerce.
Furthermore, the securities laws already include
precedents for such mandatory requirements. For example, every
issuer engaged in interstate commerce, in a business affecting
interstate commerce, or whose securities are traded by any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce can be captured by the
public company reporting rules by the mere existence of two
external criteria: total assets exceeding $1 million and a class of
equity securities held by five hundred or more holders.307
Similarly, beneficial owners of equity securities of public
companies can be forced to make certain disclosures by merely
exceeding a 5 percent ownership threshold.308
By analogy, Congress could devise similar legislation
based on one of these two precedents to similarly capture CRAs
in the web of Ratings Reform based on external criteria. For
example, Congress could put into place a ratings market share
threshold expressed as a percentage of total outstanding ratings
in each ratings class (similar to the 5 percent beneficial
ownership threshold)309 or a fixed number based on total ratings
outstanding in each ratings class (similar to the public company
reporting threshold).310 This way, the requirement would only
force registration and regulation for those CRAs producing more
than a de minimis number of ratings in each class.
Currently, the SEC has identified five different rating
classes:
financial
institutions,
insurance
companies,
corporations, asset-backed securities (i.e., structured finance
products), and government, sovereign, and municipal
securities.311 As of year-end 2010, each of the Big Three rated
306

See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (limiting
Congress’s ability to regulate noneconomic activity based on congressional findings
that it created a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
307
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12(g), 13(a), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78l(g),
78m(a) (West 2011). The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), which was
signed into law on April 5, 2012, alters the thresholds that trigger registration of an issuer’s
securities under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including a different
threshold for banks and bank holding companies. See Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 501, 601, 126
Stat. 306 (2012).
308
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d).
309
See id.
310
See id. §§ 78l(g), 78m(a).
311
See id. § 78c(a)(62)(B).
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more than 1,600 debt securities in each ratings class and held at
least 8 percent of the market share of each ratings class.312 While
A.M. Best had approximately 26 percent of the market in
insurance company ratings, no other NRSRO had more than 8
percent of the market in any other ratings class and only two
other NRSROs (DBRS and Kroll) held more than 7 percent in a
different rating class.313 In each ratings class, however, at least
five NRSROs rated one hundred or more debt securities, and at
least four NRSROs rated one thousand or more debt securities.314
These statistics, however, do not include non-NRSRO
ratings and therefore do not reflect the entire universe of CRA
credit ratings. Thus, to the extent Congress seeks to adopt such
a mandatory NRSRO registration requirement based on
external criteria, it would need to gather information about total
outstanding ratings in each class from all CRAs engaged in
interstate commerce or affecting interstate commerce. From
these figures, it could devise a threshold meant to require at
least four or five CRAs in each class to register as NRSROs such
that there would be sufficient competition and comparative data
available in each ratings class to dampen the impact that the
Big Three could have on any segment of the market.
Using the figures from the SEC’s most recent summary
report on NRSROs315 and treating them as the entire universe
of CRA credit ratings for illustrative purposes, a percentage
threshold of outstanding ratings in each class would need to be
set at 0.05 percent for each ratings class in order to capture
five CRAs in each class and 0.06 percent for each ratings class
in order to capture four CRAs in each class. If a fixed number
threshold is used instead, one hundred credit ratings in each
ratings class would capture five CRAs in each class, while one
thousand credit ratings would capture four in each class.
While such a threshold would close the voluntary
registration and withdrawal loophole by preventing or reversing
NRSRO Nullification, it would not address the underlying goal
of Ratings Reform to encourage accurate and reliable ratings.
Therefore, to the extent Congress considers adopting a
mandatory registration requirement based on external criteria,
it must also couple any such measures with a mechanism, such

312
313
314
315

See SEC SEPT. 2011 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 47, at 6-7.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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as the rating function of the Franken Proposal’s CRA Board, to
promote accurate and reliable credit ratings.
In summation, the most critical items that remain
unresolved—the Franken Proposal and the new standards of
creditworthiness—in concert with existing distinctions based on
NRSRO status could lead to a tipping point in favor of NRSRO
Nullification for at least some of today’s NRSROs to the extent
these measures continue to increase NRSRO-specific burdens
without providing NRSRO-specific benefits. The resolution of
these items could also prevent NRSRO Nullification if they
provide sufficient benefits to avoid the tipping point. Congress
could prevent or reverse NRSRO Nullification by adopting a
mandatory NRSRO registration requirement based on external
criteria that could force regulation upon a sufficient segment of
the CRAs to keep Ratings Reform intact, but this would only be
a partial solution since it would not, by itself, promote accurate
and reliable ratings.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In this final part, I present my central recommendation
for resolving the Franken Proposal and new standards of
creditworthiness in consonance with the dual goals of
promoting accurate and reliable ratings and preventing
NRSRO Nullification: the SEC should adopt a refined version
of the rating function suggested by the Franken Proposal—but
not the allocating function. In addition, the SEC should adopt
its current proposal to permit partial reliance by investment
fiduciaries on any credit ratings under the new standards of
creditworthiness, subject to one additional requirement:
investment fiduciaries seeking to rely on NRSROs that the
rater deems good performers must certify agreement with the
rater’s methodology for defining accuracy, while investment
fiduciaries seeking to rely on non-NRSROs or NRSROs that the
rater deems poor performers must publicly explain their
disagreement with the rater’s methodology or show why certain
non-NRSROs, when compared with NRSROs, produce ratings
of equal or better quality. Under this proposal, it will not be
necessary to close the voluntary registration loophole through a
mandatory registration requirement.
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Create a Rater of the NRSROs, Not a Rater and an
Allocator

My central recommendation is that the SEC should
create a rater of the NRSROs, not a rater and an allocator.316
The Franken proposal, by contrast, would put both functions in
place. This would avoid the difficult problems created by the
allocating function, which function is generally opposed by the
precise constituents it is meant to support—the smaller
NRSROs. These problems include how to choose the QNRSRO
club’s membership and how to allocate on a meritorious basis
without becoming subject to conflicts of interest or choosing a
system that the market thinks is wrong. The rating function,
on the other hand, which serves the same underlying goals,
would likely find widespread acceptance.
To the extent that the allocating function may
eventually be appropriate, there is one primary reason that it
is currently premature: there is no consensus on how to
measure the relative accuracy of one NRSRO’s performance
against another’s. The Franken Proposal’s CRA Board,
however, would be well positioned to credibly develop a set of
such metrics and to test their acceptance in the market. This is
because, as a board controlled by investor representatives, it
would be naturally aligned with the interests of investment
fiduciaries and ultimate investors.
A distinction nonetheless must be drawn between using
such metrics to influence the market and using them to make
the market. The rating function would have the effect of doing
the former, while the allocating function would have the effect
of doing the latter. Since it is predictable that some investment
316

It must be acknowledged that this recommendation has also been
advanced by Professor Lynn Bai and Senators Carl Levin and Tom Coburn. See Bai,
supra note 50, at 101 (“[T]he Franken Proposal should be modified in a way such that
the primary function of its board would be not to allocate rating jobs for the credit
rating industry, but to closely monitor and rank the performances of its players and
make this information freely accessible to the investment community.”); see also CARL
LEVIN, CHAIRMAN & TOM COBURN, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, U.S. PERMANENT
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS: COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS, WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 316 (Apr. 13, 2011)
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/fc7d55c8-661a-11e0-9d40-00144feab49a.pdf (“The SEC
should use its regulatory authority to rank the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations in terms of performance, in particular the accuracy of their ratings.”). To this
author’s knowledge, the ratings inflation risk premium hypothesized in this article that
would motivate issuers to prefer hiring the better performing NRSROs on account of
the rater’s pronouncements is a novel rationale for this recommendation.
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fiduciaries will disagree with whatever metrics are proposed by
the CRA Board, such disagreements should also be given room
to be tested in the market. Over time, there may be a
convergence over the best available methods for ranking
NRSROs based on accurate ratings. Since none yet exists, the
allocating function should not yet be adopted.
The rating function, on the other hand, should be
adopted because, standing alone, it would nonetheless promote
accurate and reliable ratings. It would do this by putting
investment fiduciaries in a stronger position to influence the
hiring decisions of issuers. Although only the allocating
function would directly address the issuer-pays conflict by
separating issuer payment of the NRSRO from issuer
selection,317 the rating function would put information into the
market that does not currently exist about which NRSROs are
the best performers.318 Investment fiduciaries, through
underwriters, could use this information during pricing
negotiations to penalize issuers for choosing poor performing
NRSROs or non-NRSROs. They could demand an interest rate
premium to compensate them for ratings inflation risk. To
avoid paying such a premium, issuers would come to prefer
hiring the most accurate performers since this would
undermine any argument that such a ratings inflation risk
premium would be appropriate. This would change the game
because rating accurately, instead of rating generously, would
become good business.
The rating function would also work to prevent NRSRO
Nullification so long as the rater only rated NRSROs and not nonNRSROs, took into account all NRSRO ratings (i.e., solicited and
unsolicited) and made such accuracy ratings, including the
metrics used, publicly available. Such refinements could easily be
317

Cf. supra note 189.
It must be observed that, independent of whether the SEC creates a rater to
interpret performance data, it is requiring the disclosure of such data. See supra note 219
and accompanying text. This will allow investors to analyze the same data as any such
rater and thereby develop competing accuracy rankings, which is likely a daunting and
meticulous task. This author hypothesizes that the interplay between the rater and the
market’s check and balance on the rater is the best way to create a consensus over the
meaning of relative accuracy. In the absence of a rater and a requirement that investors
double-check the rater’s methodologies, investors may not have sufficient motivation to
develop in-house views about which CRAs are the best performers in spite of the new
disclosure requirements. Even if sufficient motivation exists for investors to compete
among themselves to create accuracy rankings, the various conclusions of innumerable
investors may be too scattered to meaningfully influence the hiring decisions of issuers. A
rater would help focus the debate about which CRAs are the best performers by providing
an objective benchmark on behalf of all investors.
318
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built into the Franken Proposal’s current architecture. This would
add significant value to becoming an NRSRO because it would
allow agencies to credibly distinguish themselves based upon
their superior ability to rate accurately. This would produce more
market visibility and more business for the best performers.
Opting out of NRSRO status, by contrast, would mean losing this
important benefit.
Since the other alternatives that the SEC is considering
have no mechanism to promote accurate and reliable ratings
nor would they work to prevent NRSRO Nullification, a
modified form of the Franken Proposal adopting only this
refined rating mechanism is justified.
B.

Permit Partial Ratings Reliance Under the New
Standards

In addition, the SEC should adopt its current proposal to
permit partial reliance by investment fiduciaries on any credit
ratings under the new standards of creditworthiness subject to
one additional requirement: investment fiduciaries seeking to
rely on NRSROs that the rater deems good performers must
certify agreement with the rater’s methodology for defining
accuracy, while investment fiduciaries seeking to rely on nonNRSROs or NRSROs that the rater deems poor performers must
publicly explain their disagreement with the rater’s methodology
or show why certain non-NRSROs, when compared with
NRSROs, produce ratings of equal or better quality.
Partial reliance on credit ratings is necessary because
there is no adequate substitute in the market to replace credit
ratings. Investment fiduciaries, moreover, should not be
limited to considering only NRSRO ratings because this would
undermine the law’s purpose in shifting responsibility for
determining creditworthiness from the NRSROs to the relevant
investment fiduciary in each case. Since the rater I propose
would only rate NRSROs, and not non-NRSROs, this limitation
should negate any perverse incentives by the NRSROs to opt
out of the regulatory regime simply because investment
fiduciaries would be permitted to rely on non-NRSRO ratings.
My proposal would also promote accurate and reliable
ratings. By requiring investment fiduciaries to certify agreement
with the rater’s methodology for defining accuracy or to explain
disagreements with the rater’s methodology or reliance on nonNRSROs, a countermechanism would be introduced into the
market to check such rater’s pronouncements. This would directly
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address the Franken Proposal’s most serious flaw: the allocation
of ratings business based on an accuracy standard that the
market does not accept. This “certify or explain” rule would
harness the professional judgment of investment fiduciaries in
the service of accuracy. While there is currently no accepted
definition of accuracy in the market, the collective effort of the
rater and the community of investment fiduciaries will help bring
one into existence. At the same time, it will work against the
moral hazards that investment fiduciaries may be relying blindly
on the opinions of the rater or ignoring its signals with impunity.
C.

Consider Closing the Loophole

Finally, given this article’s focus on the threat posed by
the NRSROs’ voluntary withdrawal right, it is necessary to
consider whether this voluntary registration and withdrawal
loophole should simply be closed. While I assess this possibility
elsewhere,319 under the central recommendation I advance, closing
the voluntary registration and withdrawal loophole by adopting a
mandatory registration requirement is not necessary because a
rater will produce sufficient financial and reputational benefits
for today’s NRSROs to prevent NRSRO Nullification. While
closing the loophole would be an even more definitive way of
preventing NRSRO Nullification, it would not work to promote
accurate and reliable ratings by itself and would therefore only be
a partial solution. In addition, closing the loophole would require
new legislation by Congress, whereas my central recommendation
only requires action on the part of the SEC. There is value, in any
event, to leaving this particular loophole open: it sends a signal to
the NRSROs to stay voluntarily regulated because mandatory
regulation is always looming as an option.

319

See supra Part III.A.3.

